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  Throughout the Rehnquist Court’s so-called federalism revolution, 
as the Court cut back on federal power under Article I and the Civil 
War Amendments, many commentators asserted that the spending 
power was next to go on the chopping block. But in the last years of 
the Rehnquist Court, a majority of Justices seemed to abandon the 
federalism revolution, and in the end, the Rehnquist Court never got 
around to limiting Congress’s power under the Spending Clause. This 
Article contends that it is wrong to expect the Roberts Court to be so 
charitable about Congress’s exercise of the spending power. But the 
Court is not likely to limit the spending power in the way some hoped 
and some feared the Rehnquist Court would—by imposing direct 
limitations on the kinds of legislation Congress has power to pass 
under the Spending Clause. Direct limitations such as those proposed 
by Professors John Eastman, Lynn Baker, and Mitchell Berman are 
unlikely to find favor in the Roberts Court’s cases. Rather, the Court 
is likely to act indirectly—through doctrines that skew the 
interpretation and limit the enforceability of conditional spending 
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statutes. Those doctrines are both more analytically tractable and less 
ideologically problematic for conservative Justices than are the direct 
limitations that might be imposed on the spending power. In other 
words, the paradigm case for the Roberts Court’s restriction of the 
spending power is likely to be not United States v. Butler, but rather 
Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revolution,”1 as 
the Court cut back on federal power under Article I and the Civil 
War Amendments, many commentators asserted that the spending 
power was next to go on the chopping block. The spending power 
 
 1. Various commentators, writing in medias res, described the Rehnquist Court’s 
federalism decisions as carrying out a “federalism revolution.” See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, 
The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 30 (2001); Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of 
Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 
367, 370 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 618 (2003). See generally Jack M. Balkin & Sanford 
Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001). For those 
who, even at the time, saw those decisions as less than revolutionary, see Charles Fried, The 
Supreme Court, 1994 Term—Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 34–45 (1995); 
Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist Court, 78 IND. L.J. 
47, 48–52 (2003); Ernest A. Young, Is the Sky Falling on the Federal Government? State 
Sovereign Immunity, the Section Five Power, and the Federal Balance, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1551, 
1552 (2003) (book review). 
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seemed to offer Congress a way to circumvent the limitations the 
Court had imposed on the other legislative powers. Both legislators 
and scholars therefore offered proposals for reframing as conditional 
spending legislation those statutes the Court had held to exceed other 
federal powers.2 In turn, a number of commentators expressed 
concern (or in some cases hope) that the enactment of such proposals 
would prompt the Court to place new limitations on Congress’s 
authority to impose conditions on the receipt of federal money.3 To 
defenders of states’ rights, the spending power now seemed “[t]he 
greatest threat to state autonomy,”4 and was thus likely to be the next 
front in the federalism revolution. 
But a funny thing happened on the way to Yorktown. In the last 
years of the Rehnquist Court, a majority of the Justices seemed to 
abandon the federalism revolution and to cast doubt on whether 
there had even been a revolution at all.5 In 2003, the Court upheld the 
 
 2. See S. 928, 107th Cong. (2001) (conditioning federal funding to states on their waiver of 
sovereign immunity for some violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967); 
Ann Carey Juliano, The More You Spend, the More You Save: Can the Spending Clause Save 
Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1111, 1168 (2001); Daniel J. Meltzer, 
Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 1331, 1375–80 (2001); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism’s Paradox: The Spending Power and 
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 192–93 (2002); cf. Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., Listening to the “Sounds of Sovereignty” but Missing the Beat: Does the New 
Federalism Really Matter?, 32 IND. L. REV. 11, 17 (1998) (“In sum, even in this brave new world 
of post-post New Deal federalism, there is really no doubt that South Dakota v. Dole permits 
Congress to use the spending power to accomplish indirectly that which it may not accomplish 
directly.”); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 859, 864 n.23 (2000) (stating that the Court’s continued acceptance of the conditional 
spending power “suffuses the Court’s federalism jurisprudence, threatening to reduce all of it to 
a matter of form rather than substance”). 
 3. For prominent examples of scholars making such claims, see Lynn A. Baker, 
Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1914 (1995); Lynn A. 
Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending 
Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 460–61 
(2003); Daniel O. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flores: 
The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom from State and Local 
Infringement, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 633, 674–80 (1998); Daniel J. Meltzer, The 
Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 53–54. 
 4. Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195, 
195 (2001). 
 5. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: 
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 509 
(2006) (“[I]t seems fairly clear, at least as of 2006, that the ‘federalism revolution’ has been 
substantially slowed, if not stopped in its tracks.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of 
Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1764 (2006) (“In the last few years of the Rehnquist Court, 
however, the federalism revolution waned as the Court consistently ruled in favor of federal 
power.”); Mark Tushnet, “Meet the New Boss”: The New Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1205, 
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Family and Medical Leave Act as valid Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement legislation6 in a decision whose reasoning seemed 
inconsistent with the reasoning of earlier cases in the “revolution.”7 
And although in 2001 the Court had held that Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was not valid Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement legislation,8 in 2004 the Court held that 
Title II of the ADA was, in at least some circumstances, valid 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation9—a decision that 
again seemed to reject much of the reasoning of that earlier case.10 
And in 2005, the Court held that Congress has power under the 
Commerce Clause to prohibit the purely intrastate possession of 
home-grown marijuana used for medicinal purposes11—a decision that 
many commentators saw as inconsistent with the decisions in United 
States v. Lopez12 and United States v. Morrison,13 which were the 
Lexington and Concord (or, perhaps, the Trenton and Princeton) of 
the revolution.14 
In the end, the Rehnquist Court never got around to limiting 
Congress’s power under the Spending Clause.15 But the Court did not 
lack cases that might have raised the question. In Sabri v. United 
 
1226 (2005) (“The cases are available for more substantial development in the future, but for 
now the Court has moved back only inches from where the Warren Court left it.”). 
 6. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003). 
 7. For a strong statement of this point, see Suzanna Sherry, The Unmaking of a Precedent, 
2003 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 232–33. Robert Post expressed a similar view in The Supreme Court, 
2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 11–17 (2003). 
 8. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). 
 9. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004). 
 10. See id. at 538 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“Because today’s decision is irreconcilable 
with Garrett and the well-established principles it embodies, I dissent.”). 
 11. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005). 
 12. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 13. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 14. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead?: Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) 
Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 753 (2005) (“While the Raich majority purports to be 
following the doctrinal contours of Lopez and Morrison, it actually represents a repudiation of 
these prior cases.”); Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Instrumentalism, and the Legacy of the 
Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 906, 918–19 (2006) (contrasting Lopez and Raich). 
For a balanced assessment of Raich, which considers the case “[a] [b]ad [d]ay for [s]tate 
[a]utonomy,” see Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist 
Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21. 
 15. See Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualist Federalism to Interactive Federalism, 56 EMORY 
L.J. 1, 14 (2006) (noting that, even after the “federalism revolution,” “conditional funding 
remains an effectively unbridled source of federal power”). 
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States,16 the Court upheld a prohibition on bribing officials in federally 
funded programs17—a case that many thought pressed the limits of 
Congress’s spending power.18 And in two cases that arose during the 
late Rehnquist Court, court of appeals judges wrote dissenting 
opinions in which they argued that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act exceeded Congress’s conditional spending power.19 Section 504 
requires recipients of federal funds to refrain from discriminating on 
the basis of disability.20 Though Section 504 was enacted in 1973, 
seventeen years before Congress enacted the ADA, the plaintiffs’ 
invocation of Section 504 could readily be seen as an effort to 
circumvent the limitations that the Court had imposed on the 
constitutionality of the ADA. Yet the Rehnquist Court repeatedly 
denied certiorari in cases that had upheld the constitutionality of 
Section 504.21 
In its first two significant cases addressing the scope of federal 
power—cases that ruled (narrowly) in favor of federal abrogations of 
state sovereign immunity—the Roberts Court seemed to follow the 
same nonrevolutionary line as did the late Rehnquist Court.22 One 
 
 16. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004). 
 17. Id. at 602. 
 18. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of 
Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 116 n.118 (2004) (finding Sabri 
“troubling” for this reason); Smith, supra note 14, at 919–20 & n.80 (discussing arguments for 
the unconstitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 666). An important pre-Sabri article argued that § 666 was 
unconstitutional. See Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and 
Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 39–84 (2003). For a (hardly disapproving) 
discussion of the expansiveness of Sabri’s understanding of congressional power, see Neil S. 
Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1976–78 (2005). 
 19. See Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 374 F.3d 1161, 1171–75 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (Sentelle, J., dissenting); Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082–84 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(en banc) (Bowman, J., joined by Beam, Loken & Bye, JJ., dissenting). 
 20. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). 
 21. See Barbour, 374 F.3d at 1170, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 904 (2005); Lovell v. Chandler, 303 
F.3d 1039, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003); Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 
F.3d 161, 176 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1232 (2003); Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 
1183, 1192 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 926 (2003); Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 
1148 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1104 (2003); Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 269 
F.3d 626, 628–29 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 922 (2002); Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1081–82, 
cert. denied, 533 U.S. 949 (2001). 
 22. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 1005 (2006) (holding that Congress 
may displace state sovereign immunity when legislating pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause); 
United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877, 882 (2006) (holding that Title II of the ADA validly 
abrogates state sovereign immunity as applied to cases in which the conduct that violated the 
statute also violated the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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might, therefore, expect the Roberts Court also to be charitable about 
Congress’s exercise of the spending power. If the Court is not 
attempting to impose revolutionary constraints on Congress’s powers 
under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, it has 
no particular reason to stand guard against Congress’s 
“circumvention” of those constraints under the spending power. At 
least one informed commentator has suggested that advocates of 
conditional spending legislation have little to fear from the Roberts 
Court.23 
In this Article, I contend that it is wrong to expect the Roberts 
Court to be so charitable about Congress’s exercise of the spending 
power.24 To the extent that the Roberts Court has a conservative 
agenda, and the liberal welfare and civil-rights state continues to be 
built on conditional spending legislation, the Court will have a strong 
incentive to limit that legislation. But the Court is not likely to do so 
in the way some hoped and some feared the Rehnquist Court 
would—by imposing direct limitations on the kinds of legislation 
Congress has power to pass under the Spending Clause. Rather, the 
Court is likely to act indirectly—through doctrines that skew the 
interpretation and limit the enforceability of conditional spending 
statutes. Those doctrines have a strong pedigree in existing law, and 
they are both more analytically tractable and less ideologically 
problematic for conservative Justices than are the direct limitations 
that might be imposed on the spending power.25 
In other words, the paradigm case for the Roberts Court’s 
restriction of the spending power is not likely to be United States v. 
Butler26—the New Deal–era case that invalidated the first 
Agricultural Adjustment Act as going beyond Congress’s taxing and 
spending power.27 Rather, the paradigm case may be Arlington 
Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy.28 In Arlington 
Central, the Roberts Court held that the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA) did not authorize prevailing parents to 
 
 23. Simon Lazarus, Federalism R.I.P.? Did the Roberts Hearings Junk the Rehnquist 
Court’s Federalism Revolution?, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 30–35 (2006). 
 24. I think the Roberts Court is likely to impose at least some limitations on the exercise of 
other federal powers as well, but that is beyond the scope of my argument here. 
 25. For a brief suggestion that the Court ought to move in this direction, see Ernest A. 
Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 144–45 (2004). 
 26. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 27. Id. at 78. 
 28. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006). 
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recover expert fees.29 The Court could have reached that result as a 
matter of ordinary statutory interpretation.30 But it went out of its way 
to emphasize (repeatedly) that because “Congress enacted the IDEA 
pursuant to the Spending Clause,” the statute could not impose 
obligations on states unless Congress provided “clear notice”—
beyond what would be required outside of the conditional spending 
context—“regarding the liability at issue.”31 
Arlington Central may seem like a narrow case, and in some 
respects it is. But the “clear notice” principle it adopts could have far-
reaching consequences for the enforcement of such important federal 
laws as the statutes that set up the Medicare and Medicaid programs.32 
And a panel of the Sixth Circuit has already relied extensively on 
Arlington Central to effect substantial restrictions on the obligations 
the No Child Left Behind Act places on school districts.33 (As this 
article went to press, the Sixth Circuit had granted en banc rehearing 
but not yet issued a final ruling.) The time is ripe for an assessment of 
the indirect limitations the Court is likely to place on conditional 
spending legislation.34 
 
 29. Id. at 2457. 
 30. See id. at 2464–65 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(agreeing with the Court’s conclusion that the statute’s language failed to include expert fees 
without reaching the notice question). 
 31. Id. at 2458–59 (majority opinion) (emphasis added); see also id. at 2460 (“Thus, the text 
of 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) does not authorize an award of any additional expert fees, and it 
certainly fails to provide the clear notice that is required under the Spending Clause.”); id. at 
2461 (“Certainly the terms of the IDEA fail to provide the clear notice that would be needed to 
attach such a condition to a State’s receipt of IDEA funds.”); id. at 2463 (“Whatever weight this 
legislative history would merit in another context, it is not sufficient here. . . . In a Spending 
Clause case, the key is not what a majority of the Members of both Houses intend but what the 
States are clearly told regarding the conditions that go along with the acceptance of those 
funds.”). For an excellent discussion and critique of Arlington Central, see generally Brian 
Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 89 B.U. L. REV. 875 (2008). 
 32. Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending, Unclear Implications for 
States in Federal Healthcare Programs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 441, 486–92 (2008). 
 33. See Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 512 F.3d 252, 261–73 (6th 
Cir. 2008), vacated on rehearing en banc, No. 05-2708, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 12121 (6th Cir. 
May 1, 2008). 
 34. I discuss the most comprehensive previous treatment of indirect limits, Brian Galle, 
Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear Thinking About Conditional 
Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155 (2004), in Part II. See infra text accompanying 
note 330. (Professor Galle extends those arguments in his more recent work. Galle, supra note 
31.) It is important to note at the outset the ways in which my analysis differs from Galle’s. 
Galle limits his focus to arguing against the notice principle. My argument, by contrast, is not 
principally a normative critique. Instead, I (a) show why the Court is not likely to impose direct 
limits but is likely to impose indirect limits; (b) attempt to describe, with some precision, the 
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My argument proceeds as follows. In Part I, I explain why I do 
not believe that the Court is likely to impose significant direct 
limitations on the conditional spending power, whether by tightening 
the limitations set forth in the leading case of South Dakota v. Dole35 
or by adopting the proposals put forth by leading commentators. That 
Part adds to the literature by offering the first comprehensive 
response to the proposals of Professors Lynn Baker, Mitchell 
Berman, and John Eastman for invigorating direct limitations on 
conditional spending legislation. In Part II, I explain why I believe the 
Court is quite likely to impose more stringent indirect limitations on 
the conditional spending power. Section A addresses the strong 
contract theory proposed by David Engdahl in the leading modern 
article on the spending power (under which spending conditions are 
not “law” at all) and argues that it is possible, but not especially 
likely, that the Court will endorse that theory. Section B, which 
considers the notice principle, adds to the prior literature by 
disaggregating applications of that principle into three basic types, 
which potentially have different normative implications, and assessing 
each of those types separately. 
My principal goal is analytic and predictive; I focus on the 
direction Spending Clause litigation is likely to travel in the Roberts 
Court. A significant part of my argument rests on analytic and 
normative concerns with some possible directions the Court might 
travel. But I offer no particular account of what the law should look 
like in this area, except perhaps by implication. I hope my account 
will convince readers who share my normative views as well as 
readers who do not share those views. 
Moreover, I offer no high-level positive theory about what 
motivates a majority of the Court. Instead, I explain along the way 
 
different variants of the notice principle; and (c) assess as well the “strong contract theory” 
adopted by at least one federal court under which conditional spending legislation is not “law” 
at all. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 104–08 (1994). Moreover, to 
the extent that I am also critical of the notice principle, my arguments are different from Galle’s; 
in particular, Galle’s arguments would apply to any federalism-based clear-statement rule, but I 
accept the validity of such rules in general. See infra note 315. Professors Peter Smith and David 
Freeman Engstrom have also discussed the notice principle, though their discussions aim more 
at identifying how that principle should be interpreted (in contexts in which federal agencies 
interpret ambiguous spending statutes) than on predicting how the Court will apply that 
principle. See David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A 
Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 1197 passim (2004); Peter J. Smith, Essay, Pennhurst, Chevron, and the Spending Power, 
110 YALE L.J. 1187 passim (2001). 
 35. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–11 (1987). 
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the reasons why I think the Court is or is not likely to adopt particular 
rules of Spending Clause doctrine. My basic premise is that this is a 
conservative Court and is likely, all else equal, to serve 
“conservative” interests.36 But “‘judicial conservatism’ is not a 
coherent single project of constitutional interpretation.”37 
Importantly, the interests of conservative judges fall into several 
categories. They may be programmatic interests (that is, interests in 
upholding “conservative” statutes and invalidating “liberal” ones).38 
There are a number of conservative political programs that might 
come into tension with each other in many cases.39 Professor Young, 
 
 36. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 423, 423 
(2007) (“Conservatives finally got their court. That is the central message of the Supreme 
Court’s 2006 Term.”). For another good discussion of the Roberts Court as a conservative 
Court, see generally Mark A. Graber, Does It Really Matter? Conservative Courts in a 
Conservative Era, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 675 (2006). 
 37. Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the Close of the Rehnquist Court, 9 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 791, 817–18 (2005). This is true of judicial liberalism as well. See 
Duncan Kennedy, Strategizing Strategic Behavior in Legal Interpretation, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 
785, 798–800. 
 38. Professor Richard Fallon argued, before the Rehnquist Court sided with federal power 
in its last few federalism cases, that “[t]he Court’s pro-federalism majority is at least as 
substantively conservative as it is pro-federalism. When federalism and substantive 
conservatism come into conflict, substantive conservatism frequently dominates.” Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 429, 434 (2002). This is the “policy-focused instrumentalism” that Professor Peter Smith 
believes was characteristic of Rehnquist Court federalism cases. Smith, supra note 14, at 911–15. 
Professor Frank Cross argues, persuasively in my view, “that federalism is consistently (and I 
contend inherently) employed only derivatively, as a tool to achieve some other ideological end, 
rather than as a principled end in and of itself.” Frank B. Cross, Essay, Realism About 
Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1304, 1307 (1999). But even if one does not agree with that 
statement, it should be plain enough that federalism can be and has been used as such a tool 
some proportion of the time. 
 39. For a good overview of the point, see Fallon, supra note 38, at 446–52. In part for this 
reason, Professor Young suggests that it makes no sense to treat Supreme Court decisions as 
“liberal” or “conservative”: 
The problem is that it is hard to distinguish between a “preference” for federalism of 
the sort just described and a good faith legal view about the meaning of the 
Constitution. In the immunity cases, for instance, how much conceptual daylight is 
there between a “preference” that states not be subject to suit and a legal conviction 
that the Constitution contains a strong principle of state immunity? One cannot prove 
the primacy of political preferences over legal principle if one’s definition of political 
preferences is so broad as to include legal principles. 
Young, supra note 14, at 14–15 (footnote omitted). It does not particularly matter to me, 
however, whether one regards the conservative interests I have described as “political 
preferences” or “good faith legal views.” I take no position on the relative weight of “politics” 
and “law” in Supreme Court decisions (or on whether it makes sense to draw a strong 
distinction between them). I argue only that conservatism—whether as a “political” or a “legal” 
principle—is likely to explain and predict the Roberts Court’s federalism decisions, all else 
equal. 
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for example, identifies six different but overlapping strands in 
contemporary American political conservatism—economic 
conservatives, Libertarians, traditionalists, social or religious 
conservatives, neoconservatives, and anti-Communists40—and one can 
find programmatic disputes within each strand. Conservative judges 
may seek to maximize the degree to which their decisions support 
their favored programmatic interests directly—by seeking to advance 
those interests in each case—or in a rule-consequentialist manner by 
articulating and defending rules that ensure that, over time, 
conservative programmatic interests will be upheld to the greatest 
extent possible, even if in any given case those rules might serve 
liberal programmatic interests. They may also seek in their decisions 
to adhere to conservative ideological constructs, regardless of those 
constructs’ effect on conservative programmatic interests. These 
constructs may be very general, like notions of personal 
responsibility, or they may be specific to constitutional adjudication, 
like notions of originalism,41 states’ rights,42 or judicial restraint. There 
are many such constructs, and they, too, will stand in tension in many 
cases.43 Moreover, all of these conservative interests may in any given 
case be trumped by other interests—particularly a Justice’s interest in 
following what he or she (not to mention the public) understands to 
be the practices of careful and principled lawyering.44 That interest 
pushes toward adhering to precedent (at least on the surface45) and 
avoiding rules that are analytically unstable.46 
 
 40. See Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1139, 1192–94 (2002). 
 41. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living 
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 562–68 (2006) (reviewing the judicial use of originalism 
constructs in decisionmaking). 
 42. For an argument that conservatives should support federalism, irrespective of its effect 
on conservative programmatic interests, see generally Ernest A. Young, The Conservative Case 
for Federalism, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 874 (2006). 
 43. See Young, supra note 40, at 1198–202. 
 44. Professor Young sees this, correctly in my view, as a form of conservatism, see id. at 
1196, though it is a form of conservatism that is shared by most “conservative” and “liberal” 
judges. Writing of the Rehnquist Court, Professor Mark Tushnet argued that “Justices in the 
new regime seek to show that they are technically competent lawyers who do small things very 
well.” Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term—Foreword: The New Constitutional 
Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspirations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 91 (1998). I 
believe that continues to be true in the Roberts Court. 
 45. See Fallon, supra note 38, at 491–92 (discussing the Rehnquist Court). 
 46. See id. at 493 (noting that the Rehnquist Court’s federalism cases had “proceeded 
cautiously along doctrinal paths where previous efforts to protect federalism occasioned 
embarrassment”). 
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Although the distinctions between and tensions among these 
various interests can make a great deal of difference to the shape of 
jurisprudence in general, they are less significant to my project. I 
hope to show that efforts to impose direct limitations on the spending 
power are sufficiently analytically intractable, and threaten such an 
array of conservative interests, that a conservative Court is unlikely to 
undertake them. My picture of what moves the majority should 
resonate with observers of the Roberts Court, even if one might 
quibble with aspects of it. But I make no attempt to defend it here. 
Doing so would require an article of its own. 
I.  THE FAILURE OF DIRECT LIMITATIONS 
The Supreme Court’s Dole opinion set forth three possible direct 
limitations on Congress’s exercise of its conditional spending power.47 
The first is the “general welfare” limitation: “the exercise of the 
spending power must be in pursuit of ‘the general welfare.’”48 The 
second (stated somewhat more tentatively) is the “nexus” limitation: 
“our cases have suggested (without significant elaboration) that 
conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 
‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’”49 
And the third is the “coercion” limitation: “in some circumstances the 
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to 
pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”50 
None of these direct limitations on the spending power has had 
any real bite in the cases. In this Part, I contend that none is likely to 
have any real bite in the future. Some of the reason has to do with the 
particular limitations themselves: neither the general welfare, nexus, 
nor coercion limitations impose any analytically tractable limitation 
on congressional power. Any effort to impose robust limits on the 
spending power based on these doctrines (or on the various 
 
 47. I discuss only those limitations that are internal to the spending power; the Court also 
recognized that Congress exceeds its spending authority if it conditions a grant on conduct that 
independently violates the Constitution. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210–11 (1987) 
(“Thus, for example, a grant of federal funds conditioned on invidiously discriminatory state 
action or the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment would be an illegitimate exercise of the 
Congress’ broad spending power.”). 
 48. Id. at 207. 
 49. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality 
opinion)). 
 50. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
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alternatives to these doctrines proposed by leading scholars) is 
doomed to embarrassment. I explain in Section A. 
Analytic embarrassment will not deter a court that is bent on 
reaching particular results. But as I show in Section B, there is no 
good reason to believe that the Roberts Court has any particular 
mission to constrain Congress’s spending power. If anything, one 
should expect the contrary. 
A. The Failure of Specific Limiting Doctrines 
1. General Welfare.  Under the Supreme Court’s modern 
doctrine, forged in the 1937 New Deal settlement, the “general 
welfare” limitation on the spending power is not a limitation at all.51 
In Helvering v. Davis,52 which upheld the old-age benefits of the 
Social Security Act as a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing and 
spending power,53 the Court declared that “[w]hen money is spent to 
promote the general welfare, the concept of welfare or the opposite is 
shaped by Congress.”54 By the time of Buckley v. Valeo55 nearly forty 
years later, the Court was flirting with the proposition that the 
Constitution’s “general welfare” language imposes no limits on 
Congress’s spending power.56 In Dole, the Court retreated somewhat, 
but not much; the Court held that “[i]n considering whether a 
particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes, 
courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress,”57 and 
it reaffirmed Helvering’s statement “that ‘the concept of welfare or 
the opposite is shaped by Congress.’”58 Dole therefore left little room 
for judicial enforcement of the general welfare limitation. 
Some commentators have advocated a tightening—and 
invigorated judicial enforcement—of that limitation, however. 
Professor John Eastman has offered the leading statement of this 
position: “Congress, I contend, has only the power to spend for the 
 
 51. Professor Michele (Landis) Dauber traces the doctrine even earlier, to the turn of the 
twentieth century. See Michele Landis Dauber, Judicial Review and the Power of the Purse, 23 
LAW & HIST. REV. 451, 452–53 (2005). But it is fair to say that the New Deal settlement 
cemented deference firmly in the law. 
 52. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
 53. Id. at 645. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 56. See id. at 90–91. 
 57. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). 
 58. Id. at 208 (quoting Helvering, 301 U.S. at 645). 
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‘general’ welfare and not for the special welfare of particular regions 
or states, even if the spending was undertaken in all regions or all 
states and therefore might be said to enhance ‘general’ welfare in the 
aggregate.”59 Eastman’s argument is essentially originalist in nature; 
he derives his rule from practice under the Articles of Confederation 
and, up to the Civil War, under the Constitution.60 Relying on the 
ratification debates, Professor Robert Natelson similarly contends 
that “the goal of the General Welfare Clause was to limit all 
congressional taxation and spending to general interest, as opposed to 
local or special interest, purposes.”61 
One might agree or disagree with these originalist arguments, but 
in any event the doctrine they support is very unlikely to have 
traction in the courts. Any doctrine that would put the courts in the 
position of second-guessing Congress’s determination of what is in 
the “general welfare” will necessarily raise the concern (one to which 
conservative judges remain quite attuned)62 that the courts are 
repeating what is understood to be the mistake of Lochner v. New 
York63—the judicial arrogation of authority to decide whether 
legislation is in fact in the general interest.64 Although defenses of 
Lochner and unapologetic judicial activism have gained increasing 
currency among right-wing legal activists and academics,65 the public 
face of judicial conservatism—the face presented in confirmation 
 
 59. John C. Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. 
REV. 63, 65 (2001). 
 60. See id. at 72–87. 
 61. Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in 
Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 49 (2003). 
 62. See Graber, supra note 36, at 685. 
 63. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 64. For a good effort to connect invigorated judicial review of “general welfare” with what 
is understood to be the mistake of Lochner, see Larry Yackle, Lochner: Another Time, Another 
Place, 85 B.U. L. REV. 765, 777 (2005). 
It is obvious enough that the legislative branch must be entitled to decide what counts 
as the public interest in general. The Court could second-guess Congress at that level 
of generality only by sounding very much like Justice Peckham explaining why the 
Bake Shop Act didn’t further the public health. Just as choosing among public-
regarding purposes is for state legislatures in police power cases, selecting among 
public-regarding ends must equally be left to Congress in spending power cases. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 65. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1521–25 (2005). 
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hearings and appellate opinions—remains one of Bickellian restraint 
and deference to the political branches.66 
The arguments of Professors Eastman and Natelson might seem 
to avoid that concern. They appear to pose an equal-protection-like 
inquiry: was Congress’s taxing and spending in the general interest or 
only in someone’s (or some region’s or state’s) particular interest? 
But (at least on one prominent view) the decisions of the Lochner era 
rested on the closely related notion that “class legislation” (special 
interest, as opposed to general-interest, legislation) was 
unconstitutional.67 It is unlikely that a judicial effort to determine 
what legislation serves the general as opposed to some region’s 
particular welfare would be any more successful than the Lochner-era 
effort to distinguish class legislation from general-interest legislation. 
Intellectual developments since World War II have made it 
difficult even to conceive of a general welfare distinct from the 
aggregation of the welfare of various special interests. In particular, 
interest-group theory persuasively demonstrates that most, if not all, 
legislation is the outcome of a struggle between groups pursuing their 
own interests.68 A number of scholars have drawn on interest-group 
 
 66. See Graber, supra note 36, at 685 (“Prominent conservative scholars have made 
constitutionally reasonable arguments that the Court in Lochner v. New York correctly held 
that maximum hour laws were constitutionally suspect. Nevertheless, the vast majority of 
conservative Justices and scholars still maintain that Lochner was a gross abuse of the judicial 
power.” (footnotes omitted)). As Professor Simon Lazarus shows, that face of Bickellian 
restraint was front and center in Justice John Roberts’s confirmation hearings. See Lazarus, 
supra note 23, at 14–18. 
 67. See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE 
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 47 (1998); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION 
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 49–50 
(1993); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 246 (2000). But see 
David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of 
Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 21–31 (2003) (arguing that although pre-
Lochner lower-court cases rested on opposition to class legislation, Lochner reflected a shift to a 
notion of fundamental individual rights); Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive 
Due Process in the Taft Era Court, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 1502–03 (1998) (arguing that the 
substantive due process decisions of the Taft Court, rather than resting on opposition to class 
legislation, represented an effort to protect the decisions of “everyday life” from regulation). 
For a rejoinder to Professors Bernstein and Post, see generally Barry Cushman, Some Varieties 
and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 881 (2005). 
 68. Professor Jerry Mashaw best captures the interest-group theory’s view of legislation: 
“[It is the] vector sum of political forces expressed through some institutional matrix which has 
had profound, but probably unpredictable and nontraceable, effects on the policies actually 
expressed. There is no reason to believe that these expressions represent either rational 
instrumental choices or broadly acceptable value judgments.” Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics 
of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI-KENT L. REV. 123, 134 (1989). For a 
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theory to urge that courts should invalidate (or skeptically construe) 
legislation that reflects the disproportionate influence of particular 
interests.69 But as Professor Einer Elhague has shown, it is impossible 
to conclude that legislation reflects “disproportionate influence” 
without some contestable normative theory about what are proper 
outcomes.70 
The same problem will occur in attempting to determine whether 
a federal spending program serves the general welfare. The essential 
problems are twofold: every spending program—even one that gives 
money to very particular places and projects—will ultimately serve 
some general interests (if only the interest in Keynesian stimulus); 
and no spending program will ever incontestably serve everyone’s 
interests to precisely the same extent. As a result, any judicial effort 
to enforce a rule that spending must serve the general welfare will be 
quite indeterminate and will require courts to make what will look 
like naked policy decisions. 
Consider federal education funding to the states. One might 
readily agree that education serves the general welfare,71 but how 
ought Congress allocate funds? Congress might give each state the 
same amount per child in a public school, but states with large urban 
areas—where children require more expensive educational 
interventions72—might legitimately complain that such an allocation 
unduly subsidizes states without large urban areas. But if Congress 
were to give more money per student to states with large urban areas, 
states without those areas might legitimately complain that the 
program favored “particular regions or states.”73 To decide which of 
these complaints is correct (if either) requires a substantive theory 
about how education funds should be allocated across the states. But 
any such theory will be normatively contestable and will raise the 
question why the courts instead of Congress should be the ones to 
 
good overview of the theories of regulation that derived from or reacted to post-war pluralism, 
see Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31–86 (1998). 
 69. See Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 
101 YALE L.J. 31, 44–48 (1991). 
 70. See id. at 49–59. 
 71. Or not. Education funding, one might say, is for the “special” welfare of children, 
parents, and teachers. 
 72. See Andrew Reschovsky & Jennifer Imazeki, Let No Child Be Left Behind: 
Determining the Cost of Improving Student Performance, 31 PUB. FIN. REV. 263, 265 (2003). 
 73. Eastman, supra note 59, at 65. 
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decide which of several plausible substantive theories of fairness is 
the correct one. 
Even if we could agree on the correct substantive theory of 
fairness, determining whether a spending program is unfair under that 
theory will often depend on the level of abstraction at which the 
program is described.74 Consider a different education-funding 
example. Congress has allocated special funding to the states to 
educate the children of migrant agricultural workers.75 That funding is 
targeted at places with large concentrations of migrant agricultural 
workers, but it is part of a package of funding that provides for the 
educational needs of students across the country. Does the federal 
Migrant Education Program serve “the ‘general’ welfare” or “the 
special welfare of particular regions or states”?76 It all depends on the 
level of abstraction at which one considers the program at issue, and 
the notion of “general welfare” does not tell us which level of 
abstraction is appropriate. 
The problem exists even when one considers stand-alone 
appropriations. After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Congress passed a 
law that gave relief to the affected areas.77 That law served the special 
welfare of particular regions or states.78 But it could also be seen to 
serve the “general” welfare in at least three ways. First, the massive 
 
 74. To be sure, the “levels-of-abstraction problem” is common in constitutional 
adjudication, Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of 
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1084–85 (1981); see also Mark 
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1372–73 (1984) (making the same point), 
and it arises especially frequently when applying theories of equal treatment. For an example 
from the disability law context, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 
YALE L.J. 1, 45–50 (2004). 
 75. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-110, tit. I, pt. C, 115 Stat. 1425, 
1571–80 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6391–99 (2006)). 
 76. Eastman, supra note 59, at 65. 
 77. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of 
Mexico and Pandemic Influenza, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. B, 119 Stat. 2680, 2745–82 
(2005). 
 78. Cf. Eastman, supra note 59, at 79 (stating that “the Fourth Congress did not even 
believe it had the power to provide relief to the citizens of Savannah, Georgia after a 
devastating fire destroyed the entire city,” because such an appropriation was not for the 
“general” welfare). There is reason to doubt Professor Eastman’s account of the original 
understanding. As Professor Michele (Landis) Dauber has shown, the federal government 
frequently provided disaster relief in the early republic; although constitutional limitations were 
sometimes asserted in opposition to disaster relief bills in Congress, concerns about sectional 
fairness and the sympathy for particular disaster victims were far more important. See Michele 
L. Landis, “Let Me Next Time Be ‘Tried by Fire’”: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the 
American Welfare State 1789–1874, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 967, 998–1027 (1998). 
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dislocation occasioned by the hurricanes affected the nationwide 
economy. Second, there is no reason to expect that the same relief 
would be withheld from any other states or regions of the country if 
they were to experience a comparable disaster; a government that 
generally gives relief to regions that experience disasters acts in the 
general welfare whenever it grants such relief. And third, people 
across the nation felt a sympathetic bond with their fellow Americans; 
granting relief to the victims of Katrina and Rita increased the 
welfare of people throughout the country by reaffirming their 
psychically valuable bonds of citizenship.79 
Professor Eastman’s own examples show that reliance on the 
notion of a general welfare requires formalistic distinctions that do 
not hold up analytically. For example, Eastman cites with approval 
the antebellum practice of allowing federal funding of “navigational 
improvements below ports of entry” but not allowing internal 
“improvements beyond that line.”80 Thus, “[a]t the same time it was 
denying a request to fund the dredging of the Savannah River,” 
Congress “approved an appropriation for a lighthouse at the entrance 
of the Chesapeake Bay.”81 The distinction between the two cases, 
which Eastman endorses, is that “the lighthouse was of benefit to the 
entire coastal trade, while the dredging operation was primarily of 
benefit to the people of Georgia.”82 But, the Chesapeake Bay 
lighthouse was primarily of benefit not to the entire coastal trade but 
to the mid-Atlantic coastal trade. The benefits to the coastal trade in 
New England, New York, and the South (where Savannah was one of 
the most significant ports) were far less significant. And the Savannah 
River, which forms the border between South Carolina and Georgia, 
provided the interior areas of those states with access to the ocean. 
Facilitating shipping entering into the country at Savannah is just as 
 
 79. One might object that the last of these is not really about the “general welfare.” But 
that objection rests on the contestable normative view that economic welfare is the only kind of 
welfare that is relevant under the spending power. Cf. Elhauge, supra note 69, at 49–59 
(emphasizing that wealth maximization (that is, economic efficiency) is not the only normative 
standard that can be used as a baseline for assessing the desirability of a law). For what it’s 
worth, the Supreme Court has long held that the power to spend for the general welfare 
includes the power to spend to satisfy purely moral obligations. See Dauber, supra note 51, at 
453–56. 
 80. Id. at 84. In Professor Eastman’s account, Congress typically adhered to this line, but 
not always. Id. at 81. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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much a matter for the general welfare as facilitating shipping entering 
into the country at Baltimore. 
It was not the “generality” of the benefit conferred that 
distinguished the Chesapeake Bay lighthouse from the Savannah 
River dredging. What distinguished the two cases was an entirely 
independent notion that the federal government was properly 
concerned with “external” but not “internal” improvements to 
navigation. But I doubt the modern Court is inclined to rest its 
Spending Clause doctrine on such formalist notions of the proper 
sphere of federal power. Conservative Justices attempted to create 
such a doctrine during the National League of Cities v. Usery83 era,84 
but the Court ultimately abandoned the task as unworkable.85 Even 
when what many understood to be a pro-states’-rights majority took 
over in the late Rehnquist era, the Court passed up a clear 
opportunity to revive such a formalist doctrine.86 
 
 83. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit. Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 84. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538–40 (citing cases in which the Supreme Court and lower 
courts attempted to delineate a protected sphere of state government activity by looking to what 
were “traditional” and “integral” state functions). 
 85. The Court identified several problems with focusing on formal distinctions in the state 
immunity context: 
We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule 
of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether 
a particular governmental function is “integral” or “traditional.” Any such rule leads 
to inconsistent results at the same time that it disserves principles of democratic self-
governance, and it breeds inconsistency precisely because it is divorced from those 
principles. 
Id. at 546–47. 
 86. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000) (agreeing that the enactment of the 
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act “is a proper exercise of Congress’ authority to regulate 
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause,” without consideration of whether it 
constitutes an “integral” or “traditional” government function). In its Dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, the Court has continued to invoke the concept, seemingly discredited in 
Garcia, of “traditional government functions.” See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 
1801, 1811 (2008) (upholding Kentucky law exempting interest on municipal bonds issued by the 
state or its subdivisions, but not interest on municipal bonds issued by other states or their 
subdivisions, from state taxation, and explaining that the contrary ruling would properly spark 
“apprehension . . . about ‘unprecedented . . . interference’ with a traditional government 
function” (second alteration in original) (quoting United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer 
Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1795 (2007))). I do not think that Davis, which 
declined to invalidate “a century-old taxing practice, presently employed by 41 States, and 
affirmatively supported by all of them,” id. (citations omitted), suggests that the Court will be 
comfortable employing formalist notions of traditional state functions to invalidate federal 
spending legislation. For those who are of a mind to avoid the so-called mistake of Lochner, 
there is a big difference between upholding and invalidating a democratically enacted statute. 
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No spending legislation affects all regions in exactly the same 
way, and all spending legislation could be seen as benefiting the 
people more generally. To decide what spending serves the general 
welfare requires a normative theory independent of the concept of 
generality—a normative theory of what substantive areas of policy 
Congress should be entering. I predict that conservative judges will 
see that kind of inquiry as coming so close to Lochner that they will 
avoid embarking on it. 
2. Nexus 
 a. The Promise of the Nexus Requirement.  One might think that 
the nexus requirement could provide a meaningful limitation on 
Congress’s power to attach conditions to federal grants. Nexus 
requirements are well established in land-use and takings law—and in 
unconstitutional conditions law more generally—so courts have a 
body of precedent from which they can draw analogies in spending 
power cases.87 And unlike the general welfare limitation, which seems 
to require policy judgments that, placed in the hands of courts, are 
Lochneresque, the nexus requirement takes Congress at its word 
regarding the purpose of the federal outlay.88 By asking whether the 
condition imposed by Congress is sufficiently closely related to 
Congress’s own articulated purpose in spending federal funds, the 
nexus requirement seems to impose nothing more than the sort of 
pretext analysis that is commonplace in assessments of federal 
power.89 
A number of prominent commentators seem to believe that the 
nexus requirement has the potential to impose meaningful constraints 
on Congress’s exercise of the conditional spending power. Professor 
Jonathan Adler contends that the Clean Air Act violates the nexus 
requirement because it withholds federal highway funds from states 
that fail to submit an adequate plan for limiting emissions—including 
 
 87. On nexus requirements in land-use law, see Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a 
Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 741–45 
(2007). On the nexus requirement in unconstitutional conditions law generally, see Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1456–76 (1989). 
 88. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 n.3 (1987) (“Our cases have not 
required that we define the outer bounds of the ‘germaneness’ or ‘relatedness’ limitation on the 
imposition of conditions under the spending power.”). 
 89. On the importance of pretext analysis to assessments of federal power, see J. Randy 
Beck, The Heart of Federalism: Pretext Review of Means-End Relationships, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 407, 408–11 (2003). 
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emissions from stationary sources.90 And Professor Lynn Baker 
contends that 23 U.S.C. § 409, which the Supreme Court upheld on 
Commerce Clause grounds in Pierce County v. Guillen,91 would have 
violated the Dole nexus test as well: by conditioning federal highway 
safety funds on state courts’ recognition of an evidentiary privilege in 
government documents compiled or collected for the purpose of 
identifying hazards on the roads—even if they were documents like 
ordinary police reports that were not generated for the purpose of 
identifying such hazards—the statute imposes a condition that does 
not serve the federal interest in highway safety.92 
The decided cases offer at least some reason to believe that the 
nexus requirement is a more likely source of limits on the conditional 
spending power than is the general welfare requirement. Unlike with 
the general welfare requirement, leading jurists have invoked the 
nexus requirement on occasion as a ground for invalidating 
conditional spending legislation. In Dole, Justice O’Connor 
contended that Congress violated that requirement by conditioning a 
state’s receipt of certain federal highway funds on the adoption of a 
twenty-one-year-old drinking age.93 The solicitor general had argued 
that the imposition of a drinking age related directly to the federal 
interest in constructing safe highways (by reducing drunk driving), 
but Justice O’Connor found the condition “far too over and under-
inclusive”—most teen drinkers don’t drive drunk, and most drunk 
drivers aren’t teenagers.94 She concluded that a requirement imposed 
on states as a condition on federal spending is valid only if “the 
requirement specifies in some way how the money should be spent, so 
that Congress’ intent in making the grant will be effectuated”95: 
When Congress appropriates money to build a highway, it is entitled 
to insist that the highway be a safe one. But it is not entitled to insist 
as a condition of the use of highway funds that the State impose or 
change regulations in other areas of the State’s social and economic 
life because of an attenuated or tangential relationship to highway 
 
 90. See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental 
Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 447–52 (2005). 
 91. Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147 (2003). 
 92. See Lynn A. Baker, Lochner’s Legacy for Modern Federalism: Pierce County v. Guillen 
as a Case Study, 85 B.U. L. REV. 727, 750–51 (2005). 
 93. Dole, 483 U.S. at 213–14 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. at 214. 
 95. Id. at 216 (quoting Brief of the National Conference of State Legislators et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19–20, Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (No. 86-260)). 
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use or safety.96 
Were it otherwise, she argued, “Congress could effectively regulate 
almost any area of a State’s social, political, or economic life on the 
theory that use of the interstate transportation system is somehow 
enhanced.”97 A panel of the Eighth Circuit applied a similar analysis 
in holding that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which 
prohibits recipients of federal funding from discriminating on the 
basis of disability,98 exceeded Congress’s spending power.99 
But Justice O’Connor spoke in dissent in Dole, and the Eighth 
Circuit went en banc and overturned the panel decision invalidating 
Section 504. And that should not be surprising. For two basic reasons, 
which I discuss in the next two subsections, courts are unlikely to use 
the nexus requirement to impose a meaningful limitation on 
Congress’s power to attach conditions to federal spending. 
 b. The Specter of Lochner.  First, contrary to what appears at first 
glance, stringent application of the nexus requirement will indeed 
often require courts to make the sorts of policy judgments that 
conservative judges are likely to consider Lochneresque. Consider 
Justice O’Connor’s discussion of the over- and underinclusiveness of 
the drinking-age condition in Dole. Because legislation can rarely if 
ever achieve its purposes with precision, most if not all laws are over- 
and underinclusive to some degree. And there is no obvious and 
nonarbitrary standard for determining how well a statute must 
achieve its asserted purposes. With the New Deal reaction to Lochner 
still dominant among conservative judges,100 it is difficult to explain 
why courts, rather than legislators, should be the ones to decide 
whether a statute is sufficiently effective to remain the law.101 
 
 96. Id. at 215. 
 97. Id. 
 98. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). 
 99. See Bradley v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ., 189 F.3d 745, 757 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Arkansas is 
forced to renounce all federal funding, including funding wholly unrelated to the RA, if it does 
not want to comply with § 504.”), rev’d en banc sub nom. Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079 
(8th Cir. 2000); see also Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 374 F.3d 1161, 1171–75 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (arguing that Section 504 violates the nexus 
requirement). 
 100. See supra note 66. 
 101. Conservative judges are happy to look for over- and underinclusiveness in cases 
involving so-called heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2755–58 (2007) (plurality opinion). But in those cases they do not 
look for tightness of means-ends fit for its own sake; rather, they do so either as a way to ensure 
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Professor Baker’s argument for the unconstitutionality of 23 
U.S.C. § 409 illustrates the problem. Baker contends that attaching an 
evidentiary privilege to information compiled or collected for the 
purpose of identifying hazards on roads did not serve the interest in 
highway safety that animated the underlying spending program. The 
government argued, plausibly, that such a privilege will encourage 
localities to make efforts to identify hazards on roads—without such a 
privilege, localities might fear that their efforts would actually 
increase their tort exposure by generating evidence that plaintiffs 
could use to prove negligence. Baker agrees that an evidentiary 
privilege limited to documents originally generated for purposes of 
identifying roadway hazards might well serve the interest in highway 
safety in this way. But she contends that an evidentiary privilege for 
information that was merely compiled or collected for purposes of 
identifying roadway hazards—even if a locality generated the 
information wholly independently of such an effort—gives localities 
more tort immunity than is necessary to incentivize them to 
participate in the hazard-identification program. By reducing 
localities’ tort exposure without encouraging localities to participate 
in the hazard identification program, Baker argues, § 409 actually 
disserves the interest in highway safety.102 
Professor Baker’s argument is plausible. But the opposite 
argument is at least as plausible. A privilege for all information 
compiled or collected in the hazard-identification program might well 
be necessary to encourage localities to participate if those localities 
are risk averse. And Congress might well conclude that the additional 
increment of effective tort immunity caused by the broader privilege 
would not meaningfully reduce localities’ incentives to take care. 
Such a conclusion might be based, for example, on doubts about the 
(positive) deterrent effect of tort liability in general.103 
 
that especially protected interests are not lightly infringed or as a way to smoke out illegitimate 
intent. See Charles Fried, Types, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 55, 62–63 (1997). But the conservative 
Justices have not shown any especial desire to impose a general requirement of tight means-
ends fit. For a unanimous example of the Court’s deferential approach that highlights the 
difficulties of a general requirement of tight means-ends fit, see Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of 
Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 108 (2003). 
 102. See Baker, supra note 92, at 750–51. 
 103. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, Second-Best Damage Action Deterrence, 55 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 517, 524–35 (2006) (showing that tort liability can alter defendants’ behavior without 
reducing risk and harm of accidents); Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of 
Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 390, 443, 390–422 (1994) 
(reviewing the literature concerning whether “tort law, in its various branches, achieves 
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To decide which of these opposing stories is correct requires an 
analysis of the available empirical evidence, as well as a more fine-
grained theory of local government incentives. Professor Baker 
provides neither. More importantly, for a court to decide which of 
these opposing stories is correct would necessarily require it baldly to 
second-guess Congress’s resolution of these empirical questions 
regarding how municipalities will respond to the law. As Professor 
Larry Yackle has said, this sort of nexus analysis looks a lot like 
“Lochner resurgent in another place,”104 and courts are likely to see it 
as such. 
 c. Analytic Emptiness.  There is a second, more fundamental, 
reason why the courts are unlikely to employ the nexus requirement 
to impose meaningful limits on Congress’s conditional spending 
authority: as a purely analytic matter, that requirement imposes no 
limitation at all on Congress’s power to attach conditions to federal 
spending. That is because “germaneness theories founder on the 
extreme malleability of the concept of germaneness itself. 
Germaneness to the purpose of a benefit depends crucially on how 
broadly or narrowly that purpose is defined.”105 Since United States v. 
Butler106 adopted the so-called Hamiltonian position on Congress’s 
spending authority (although the Court did not appear to heed that 
position in its bottom-line holding invalidating the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act),107 it has been settled law that Congress can spend 
for any otherwise constitutional purpose it wishes; Congress is not 
limited to spending in aid of the other enumerated Article I powers.108 
The condition imposed by Congress can therefore always be 
characterized as part of the purpose of a piece of conditional 
 
anything by way of deterrence” and concluding that “while not as effective as economic models 
suggest, [tort law] may still be somewhat successful in achieving its stated deterrence goals”). 
 104. Yackle, supra note 64, at 779. 
 105. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 1474. 
 106. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 107. Id. at 65–66. 
 108. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987). In his major article on the 
spending power, Professor David Engdahl argues that “this kind of ‘germaneness’ requirement 
assumes the anti-Hamiltonian premise that spending is permissible only for certain specified 
ends.” Engdahl, supra note 34, at 57–58. I do not think that is quite true. As the discussion in the 
text shows, the nexus requirement does not impose any meaningful constraint once one accepts 
the Hamiltonian view adopted in Butler and Dole, but the requirement does not presuppose the 
rejection of that view. 
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spending legislation. Dole’s nexus requirement, therefore, “is 
vacuous.”109 
There is no requirement that federal spending have a single 
purpose, and both common sense and a basic understanding of 
politics reveal that federal funding legislation (like any legislation) 
typically has multiple purposes.110 A senator may vote for farm 
subsidies to protect family farmers and stabilize rural communities, to 
distribute wealth to agribusiness, to bolster the senator’s presidential 
prospects (with the Iowa caucuses in mind), or as part of a deal to 
ensure the passage of food stamp legislation.111 Highway subsidies, 
even without the condition upheld in Dole, serve at least the purposes 
of facilitating commerce, employing construction workers, and 
bolstering labor unions. When Congress gives states money to build 
highways on the condition that they raise their drinking ages to 
twenty-one, that program serves all of the purposes that highway 
subsidies in general serve, plus the additional purpose of encouraging 
states to raise their drinking ages by giving them a valuable benefit in 
exchange for their doing so. By definition, then, the drinking-age 
 
 109. Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, 
Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 105. The Court has applied a form of nexus analysis 
to hold that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) preempted a California law that barred 
recipients of state funds from using those funds to assist or deter union organizing. See Chamber 
of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2414–16 (2008). But unlike in the Spending Clause 
context, in which Congress can generally spend for any purpose it likes, the NLRA limits state 
conduct—including spending—that the Court finds to have too great an effect on areas the 
statute leaves to the “free play of economic forces.” Id. at 2412 (quoting Machinists v. Wis. 
Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976)). Although Chamber of Commerce 
could provide a template for stringent nexus review under the Spending Clause, the significant 
difference in context—and the fact that the Court has never invalidated a federal spending 
statute for having an insufficient nexus—suggests that the Justices might well see things 
differently under the Spending Clause. 
 110. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as 
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 335 (1990) (“The complex compromises endemic in 
the political process suggest that legislation is frequently a congeries of different and sometimes 
conflicting purposes. To be enacted, a statute must be acceptable to a range of interest groups, 
each of which will have their own reasons for supporting, or at least not opposing, the statute.”). 
For judicial recognition of this point, see Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 
108 (2003). 
 111. See John Ferejohn, Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp 
Legislation, in CONGRESS AND POLICY CHANGE 223, 231–45 (Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Leroy N. 
Rieselbach & Lawrence C. Dodd eds., 1986) (explaining that urban Democrats voted for farm 
legislation in exchange for Republican support for food stamp legislation); David A. Super, The 
Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in the Wake of the 1996 
Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1383 n.480 (2004). 
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condition is directly related to “the federal interest” in the highway 
funding program.112 
Similarly, when Congress imposes a cross-cutting condition like 
Section 504, which provides that states that receive federal funds for 
any of their operations must refrain from disability discrimination in 
all of their operations,113 the nexus requirement is readily satisfied. 
After Congress imposes such a condition, any new federal grant takes 
on at least two purposes: (a) subsidizing whatever activity the grant 
pays for (highway construction, public education, and so on) and 
whatever additional purposes that subsidy serves, and (b) 
encouraging the state to refrain from disability discrimination in all of 
its operations by providing the state a valuable benefit in exchange. 
As the Third Circuit has explained, Section 504 “expresse[s] a clear 
interest in eliminating disability-based discrimination in state 
departments or agencies,” an interest that “flows with every dollar 
spent by a department or agency receiving federal funds.”114 
d. Justice O’Connor’s Variant.  Even Justice O’Connor’s 
seemingly narrow view of the conditional spending power, which 
Professor David Engdahl calls the “harshest” variety of nexus 
requirement,115 imposes no meaningful limits. In Dole, Justice 
O’Connor argued that “Congress has no power under the Spending 
Clause to impose requirements on a grant that go beyond specifying 
 
 112. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. 
 113. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2006). 
 114. Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 175–76 (3d Cir. 2002). One scholarly treatment 
suggests that Section 504 violates the nexus requirement. See Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony 
Reese & Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: 
How to “Fix” Florida Prepaid (and How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1137–42 (2001). But 
Professors Berman, Reese, and Young do not explain why encouraging the state not to 
discriminate cannot be a valid purpose of federal spending legislation. The dissenting appellate 
opinions that have argued that Section 504 violates the nexus requirement have the same 
problem. See Barbour v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 374 F.3d 1161, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(Sentelle, J., dissenting) (asserting that “[t]he purpose of the federal funds WMATA receives is 
to subsidize the mass-transit services WMATA provides” without explaining why federal funds 
cannot have multiple purposes); Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1084 (8th Cir. 2000) (en 
banc) (Bowman, J., dissenting) (“Here, the condition (waiver of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity with respect to Rehabilitation Act claims) bears no direct relationship (indeed, not 
even a discernible relationship) to the purpose of most federal grants to the states for education. 
That purpose, broadly stated, is to improve the overall quality of education.”). 
 115. Engdahl, supra note 34, at 56. 
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how the money should be spent.”116 Engdahl contends that under such 
a rule, “scarcely any conditions could be imposed except those 
designating authorized uses or specifying accounting methods.”117 But 
“specifying how the money should be spent” seems to reach further 
than that. As Engdahl’s reference to “accounting methods” suggests, 
Congress is “specifying how the money should be spent” when it 
requires federal funding recipients to adopt controls to ensure that 
the money is not stolen or wasted.118 When Congress imposes such a 
requirement, it is effectively saying, “Spend this money (for highways, 
schools, or whatever) through a process that avoids theft or waste.” 
But that analysis would permit Congress to do far more than 
impose accounting methods. As Justice O’Connor recognized, it 
would also permit Congress to require state employees who worked 
on federally funded programs to refrain from partisan political 
activity.119 Indeed, when the Court upheld the Hatch Act provision 
that imposed that very requirement, it recognized—in O’Connor-like 
language—that the provision represented the exercise of Congress’s 
“power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to states 
shall be disbursed.”120 In particular, Congress sought to ensure “better 
public service” in federally funded programs “by requiring those who 
administer funds for national needs to abstain from active political 
partisanship.”121 Justice O’Connor endorsed the Court’s decision to 
uphold the Hatch Act, a statute she believed was “appropriately 
viewed as a condition relating to how federal moneys were to be 
expended.”122 
If the Hatch Act is a valid exercise of Congress’s power to specify 
how its funds are to be expended, then it is difficult to see how Justice 
O’Connor’s supposedly “harsh” view imposes any real limitation on 
conditional spending. In requiring the members of the Oklahoma 
Highway Commission to refrain from partisan political activity, 
Congress did not tell the state where or on what to spend federal 
 
 116. Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief of the National 
Conference of State Legislators et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 95, at 
19–20). 
 117. Engdahl, supra note 34, at 57. 
 118. The statute the Court upheld in Sabri—18 U.S.C. § 666—is an example of the point. See 
supra text accompanying notes 16–18. 
 119. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 217 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 120. Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Dole, 483 U.S. at 217 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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money. Congress simply declared that federal money must be spent in 
a context that is free from the kind of “active political partisanship” 
that may prevent the state from accomplishing the federal program’s 
purpose.123 By parity of analysis, Congress could require states to keep 
all items purchased with federal financial assistance in a secure, 
fenced-in area that is guarded by a police patrol. Congress would be 
specifying how its money was spent—“Don’t buy anything unless you 
have a secure, fenced-in area with police patrol to put it in”—and it 
would be doing so to ensure its money was not wasted. Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act, which effectively tells states that they must 
spend federal money in a context that is free from disability 
discrimination,124 would be constitutional on a similar analysis.125 
But, in almost exactly the same way, the condition in Dole itself 
could readily be characterized as merely specifying how federal 
highway funds were spent. As Justice O’Connor acknowledged in her 
dissent, “[w]hen Congress appropriates money to build a highway, it 
is entitled to insist that the highway be a safe one.”126 By requiring 
states that receive the full measure of federal highway funds to raise 
their drinking ages to twenty-one, Congress could be characterized as 
simply telling those states that they may spend those funds only in 
conditions that Congress believes conducive to safety on the highways 
they build. If the Hatch Act merely specified how federal money 
should be spent, the Dole statute did the same thing. 
The above discussion should demonstrate that Professor Engdahl 
was wrong to argue that “any time the notion of a germaneness 
requirement is even taken seriously it puts Hamilton and his view of 
the spending power out of reach.”127 If anything, the opposite is true: 
 
 123. Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 143. 
 124. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). 
 125. I don’t think it particularly matters for these purposes that Section 504’s requirements 
extend to “all of the operations of” a government entity, “any part of which” receives federal 
funding. Id. § 794(b). Congress might legitimately think that proven discrimination in one part 
of a federally funded entity is evidence of discrimination in other parts that more directly 
receive federal funds. Or Congress may simply understand that “[m]oney is fungible,” Sabri v. 
United States, 541 U.S. 600, 606 (2004), so that federal funding of one part of a governmental 
entity will end up financing (and perhaps subsidizing) discrimination in another part of that 
entity, see id. On the fungibility of money in state budgets, see David Super, Rethinking Fiscal 
Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2561 (2005). 
 126. Dole, 483 U.S. at 215 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 127. Engdahl, supra note 34, at 62. In a footnote to an article published over a dozen years 
after his major spending power article, Professor Engdahl seems to have recognized the point 
(without acknowledging his prior position). See David E. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the 
Federal Spending Power, 52 S.D. L. REV. 496, 496 n.3 (2007) (“[A]dding any condition(s) to a 
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once one accepts the Hamiltonian view that Congress’s spending 
power is not limited by the other Article I powers, the nexus 
requirement is unlikely to impose a meaningful limit on Congress’s 
imposition of conditions on spending. 
3. Coercion 
 a. The Problems with the Traditional Coercion Doctrine.  Nor is 
the coercion doctrine likely to impose meaningful limits on the 
conditional spending power. As two leading scholars have observed, 
“the lower courts have consistently failed to find impermissible 
coercion, even when a state has demonstrated that either the absolute 
amount or percentage of federal money at stake is so large that it has 
‘no choice but to accept the [federal legislation’s] many 
requirements.’”128 Since the Supreme Court’s 1936 decision in United 
States v. Butler, the closest any court has come to invalidating 
conditional spending legislation on coercion grounds has been the 
Fourth Circuit’s 1997 en banc decision in Virginia Department of 
Education v. Riley.129 In Riley, six judges concluded that the federal 
government’s withholding of funds to Virginia under the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act raised a serious question of coercion 
because “the Federal Government has withheld from the 
Commonwealth 100% of an annual special education grant of $60 
million because of the Commonwealth’s failure to provide private 
educational services to less than one-tenth of one percent (126) of the 
128,000 handicapped students for whom the special education funds 
were earmarked.”130 But those six judges did not constitute a majority, 
and they were unwilling to hold that the withholding of funds actually 
crossed the coercion line in any event.131 
As with the nexus doctrine, it is easy to see why the coercion 
doctrine has proven ineffective as a limit on Congress’s power to 
attach conditions to grants of federal funds to states. The basic 
problem is well rehearsed in the literature: Determinations that a 
 
grant adds ipso facto to the purpose(s) of that grant, so that ‘unrelated’ conditions are logically 
impossible.”). 
 128. Baker & Berman, supra note 3, at 468–69 (quoting Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 
1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
 129. Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 130. Id. at 569 (quoting Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 86 F.3d 1337, 1355 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(Luttig, J., dissenting)). The majority en banc opinion adopted in whole and reprinted Judge 
Luttig’s dissenting panel opinion. 
 131. See id. (reserving the question). 
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conditional offer of federal funds coerces the states tend to depend on 
normatively contestable premises about states’ baseline entitlement 
to federal largesse.132 Such premises are “especially problematic” 
when considered “against the backdrop of a constitutional 
jurisprudence in which most redistribution is permissible and few 
affirmative obligations on government are imposed.”133 No less a 
conservative luminary than Justice Scalia has declared, in an opinion 
for the Court, that “Congress has no obligation to use its Spending 
Clause power to disburse funds to the States; such funds are gifts.”134 
As Professor Kathleen Sullivan has explained, “[t]o hold that 
conditions coerce recipients because they make them worse off with 
respect to a benefit than they ought to be runs against the ground 
rules of the negative Constitution on which the unconstitutional 
conditions problem rests.”135 
As a number of commentators have shown, this problem has 
doomed efforts by such prominent scholars as Professors Richard 
Epstein and Seth Kreimer to articulate baselines that would give 
meaning to the coercion inquiry in conditional-offer cases.136 And 
even opponents of lax review of conditional spending such as 
 
 132. My discussion in this paragraph glosses over lots of nuances in the literature, but those 
nuances do not detract from the basic point. For illuminating discussions of coercion, see 
generally Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 440, 440–72 (Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes & Morton 
White eds., 1969); ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987). For good discussions of the 
problems, see generally LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF 
BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 77–90 (1996); Larry Alexander, 
Understanding Constitutional Rights in a World of Optional Baselines, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
175 (1989); Sullivan, supra note 87, at 1442–54. 
 133. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 1450. 
 134. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686–87 
(1999). 
 135. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 1450. My point is not to endorse the notion of the “Negative 
Constitution,” Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 
2273 (1990) (criticizing the assumption underlying a “Negative Constitution” and proposing that 
scholars discard the rhetoric of negative rights), but merely to observe that it is a notion to 
which conservative judges strongly adhere. 
 136. For a good instantiation of Epstein’s effort, see generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, 
BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993). For Kreimer’s effort, see Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational 
Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1352–78 
(1984). For discussions of the problems with these efforts, see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion 
Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 13–14 
(2001); Louis Michael Seidman, Essay, Reflections on Context and the Constitution, 73 MINN. L. 
REV. 73, 78–80 (1988); sources cited supra note 132. Indeed, even Professor Kreimer himself 
appears to acknowledge that his approach has only limited traction—if that—in practice. See 
Adler & Kreimer, supra note 109, at 91–92. 
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Professors Lynn Baker and Mitchell Berman concede that it is 
“unlikely” that courts will adopt a test that “provid[es] that a 
spending condition is impermissibly coercive if it presents a state with 
either no rational choice or no fair choice but to accept.”137 The “no-
rational-choice and no-fair-choice constructions of impermissible 
coercion,” they assert, “are just too amorphous to be judicially 
administrable.”138 (This is just another way of saying that under the 
negative Constitution there is no ready way to determine that the 
federal government’s withholding of largesse to the states denies 
them a “fair” choice to refuse the federal government’s condition.) 
But both Professors Baker and Berman have offered their own 
refinements of the coercion test—refinements that they believe would 
avoid these difficulties. Neither refinement solves the problem, 
however. 
 b. The Problems with Professor Baker’s Refinement.  When 
Congress uses its spending authority to impose conditions on states 
that it could not mandate under its other Article I powers, Professor 
Baker proposes that courts treat the conditions as coercive unless the 
conditional spending law is “reimbursement spending” legislation—a 
law that “specifies the purpose for which the states are to spend the 
offered federal funds and simply reimburses the states, in whole or in 
part, for their expenditures for that purpose.”139 She reasons that 
federal offers to states are inherently coercive, because, in her words, 
“the federal government has a monopoly power over the various 
sources of state revenue.”140 In particular, she contends, federal 
revenue essentially comes directly out of the states’ pockets—the 
federal government has plenary power to tax the income of state 
residents, and every dollar of tax collected by the federal government 
is a dollar of potential revenue that the state cannot get its hands 
on.141 “Thus, when the federal government offers the states money, it 
can be understood as simply offering to return the states’ money to 
them, often with unattractive conditions attached.”142 
 
 137. Baker & Berman, supra note 3, at 521. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Baker, supra note 3, at 1916 & n.16. 
 140. Id. at 1935. 
 141. Id. at 1937. 
 142. Id. 
BAGENSTOS IN FINAL2.DOC 11/16/2008  9:58:47 PM 
2008] SPENDING CLAUSE LITIGATION 375 
Although this analysis would seem to make any exercise of the 
conditional spending power coercive, Professor Baker is particularly 
concerned with the prospect that a majority of states will impose their 
policy preferences on outlier states by securing the passage of 
conditional spending legislation.143 She gives the example of the death 
penalty: most states have adopted capital punishment in their criminal 
justice systems, but those states might someday conclude that they are 
losing highly educated and mobile workers (who may be less likely to 
support capital punishment) to states with no death penalty.144 “But if 
Congress is permitted to offer the states federal funds on the 
condition that they make the death penalty available for first degree 
murder convictions,” Baker contends, “a simple majority of states will 
be able to harness the federal lawmaking power to restrict the 
competition for residents and tax dollars that would otherwise exist 
among them.”145 
Professor Baker’s reimbursement-spending rule is designed to 
prevent this situation. Baker illustrates the point, again, with a death 
penalty example. She contrasts a hypothetical statute that offers 
“federal Death Penalty Funds” to reimburse states for “their 
demonstrated cost of executing those sentenced to death for first 
degree murder” with another hypothetical statute that gives states 
money apportioned on a population basis “to provide ‘beat cops’” for 
urban neighborhoods on the condition that receiving states “hav[e] 
the death penalty available for first degree murder convictions.”146 
Although both of these statutes “provide states an incentive to make 
the death penalty available,” Baker contends that the former statute 
would be “surely preferable” for a state that “preferred not to have 
the death penalty.”147 Such a state would give up federal funds for the 
 
 143. See id. at 1942. 
 144. See id. at 1947–48. Professor Baker uses this example as part of an effort to show that 
liberals, as well as conservatives, have something to fear from broad conditional spending 
authority—a point that Baker has frequently made in her work on federalism. See, e.g., Lynn A. 
Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 433, 442 (2002) (arguing that 
liberals should favor the judicial enforcement of states’ rights). But it all depends on your risk 
tolerance. To be sure, conditional spending could be used to support conservative legislation—
which is one reason why, I explain in Section B, conservative Justices are unlikely to impose 
significant limitations on that tool. But a liberal who believes in activist government might 
reasonably conclude that the risk of some bad legislation is worth it for the prospect of enacting 
some good legislation. It is not hard to see why a liberal might think that Medicaid is worth the 
Solomon Amendment, for example. 
 145. Baker, supra note 3, at 1948. 
 146. Id. at 1967–68. 
 147. Id. at 1969. 
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death penalty—but those funds would not be especially tempting for 
a state that did not want to have the death penalty in the first place. 
But the latter statute imposes an additional cost on noncomplying 
states by requiring them to give up federal funds for activities that 
they do undertake—an additional cost that makes the law “especially 
likely to induce otherwise reluctant states to comply.”148 
It seems to me quite unlikely that the courts will adopt Professor 
Baker’s proposal. For one thing, the proposal rests on a notion of 
coercion that falls prey to the same baseline problems I discussed in 
this Section. Baker articulates a clear baseline against which to 
measure coercion: when the federal government spends, it is really 
spending “the states’ money,”149 so the states are entitled to receive 
federal assistance in proportion to their share of the federal tax base. 
But the notion that the federal government has an affirmative 
obligation to give financial assistance to the states, no less than the 
baselines proposed by earlier scholars, “runs against the ground rules 
of the negative Constitution.”150 As a matter of empirical public 
finance, it is doubtful that federal taxation, particularly at early 
twenty-first century levels, imposes significant practical limits on 
states’ ability to raise revenue from their residents.151 And as a 
normative matter, the notion that federal tax revenues are really “the 
states’ money” seems to pervert the (already perverse) libertarian 
dictum that taxation is theft. In Baker’s view, federal taxation is 
theft—not from the taxpayers, but from the states (who are really 
entitled to the revenues). But there is no normative reason to think of 
 
 148. Id. at 1970. 
 149. Id. at 1937. 
 150. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 1450; see also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686–87 (1999) (“Congress has no obligation to use its 
Spending Clause power to disburse funds to the States; such funds are gifts.”). 
 151. See Galle, supra note 34, at 190 & n.221 (noting that federal taxation, by avoiding 
states’ collective action problems, “is able to tap a large base of revenue unavailable to the 
states,” that “Professor Baker offers no evidence that federal tax levels, either now or at any 
time in history, have been so high that they have exceeded this base,” and that “the 
conventional wisdom is that state and federal tax levels rise and fall together”); Super, supra 
note 125, at 2561 (“[B]ecause states have broad revenue-raising powers on their own and large, 
diversified budgets, a failure to provide fiscal assistance—a disinterest in federalism—does not 
necessarily prevent states from acting unilaterally. Because a state can raise another tax when 
one is struck down or can cut another program when federal mandates make one more 
expensive, federal policies do not directly constrain the broader scope of states’ 
policymaking.”). But cf. id. at 2593 (“Congress and the Court have been weakening states’ fiscal 
positions by hobbling states’ revenue-raising capacities in ways difficult to reconcile with both 
institutions’ strong pro-state rhetoric . . . .”). 
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the states as really entitled to the revenues collected by the federal 
government. One could much more plausibly argue that adoption of 
the Sixteenth Amendment reflects the view that the federal 
government has, and ought to have, the first claim on the tax base. 
Moreover, Professor Baker’s reimbursement-spending rule is not 
well tailored to address her concern that majority states are using 
conditional spending legislation to induce outliers to bring their 
policies into line with the majority. To return to Baker’s two 
hypothetical death penalty statutes, it is far from clear that a state that 
opposed capital punishment would prefer the reimbursement-
spending law (that provided states funds to pay for death penalty 
prosecutions) to the regulatory spending law (that conditioned funds 
for beat cops on the state’s adoption of capital punishment). If one 
accepts Baker’s premise that the federal government is spending “the 
states’ money,” then a state without capital punishment can easily see 
the reimbursement-spending law as one that gives pro-death-penalty 
states a competitive advantage by paying for some of their capital 
punishment costs and thus freeing up money to spend on other 
worthy projects. The reimbursement-spending law takes 
noncomplying states’ money, but it gives them nothing in return. 
The law that conditions funds for beat cops on a state’s adoption 
of capital punishment, by contrast, might be welcomed by a state 
without the death penalty. Such a law might well effect a positive-sum 
transaction between the states. The states that want capital 
punishment throughout the nation can achieve that goal, but only if 
they pay the holdout price of the states that do not have the death 
penalty. Receipt of that holdout price would, by definition, permit 
states that do not have the death penalty to trade their abolitionism 
for resources that will pay for projects that matter more to them.152 
Baker rests her arguments on the view that prohibiting “regulatory 
spending” enhances social welfare,153 but it is hard to see how social 
 
 152. See Galle, supra note 34, at 186–87 (“[M]inority states will recognize that they can 
obtain holdout costs from the majority.”). For an excellent discussion of the point, see Roderick 
M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes 
Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 871–91 (1998). 
 153. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 3, at 1935 (“[F]ederal regulatory spending is especially 
likely to reduce aggregate social welfare by reducing the diversity among the states in the 
package of taxes and services, including state constitutional rights and other laws, that each 
offers to its residents and potential residents.”). I follow, without passing judgment on, 
Professor Baker’s treatment of states as unitary actors with relatively stable sets of preferences. 
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welfare is enhanced by blocking that transaction.154 It is especially 
hard to see why a state without the death penalty would prefer that 
“its” money subsidize other states’ capital punishment systems. 
 c. The Problems with Professor Berman’s Refinement.  Professor 
Berman argues that we can avoid the baseline problem altogether by 
adopting a theory of coercion that does not take the states’ baseline 
entitlements as a starting point. Instead, he argues that a conditional 
offer of federal spending is “coercive for purposes of constitutional 
law—hence presumptively unconstitutional—if it would violate the 
Constitution for the [federal government] to carry out its threat” to 
withhold funds.155 But that formulation hardly solves the problem. 
The doctrine looks to coercion as a way of determining whether a 
piece of conditional spending legislation violates the Constitution; to 
say that a piece of conditional spending legislation is coercive 
whenever its embedded threat violates the Constitution simply brings 
the argument full circle. 
Recognizing that point, Professor Berman proposes that it would 
violate the Constitution for the federal government to withhold 
federal funds as a penalty for a state’s exercise of its Tenth 
Amendment rights.156 But even that formulation does not solve the 
problem because we need to know what a penalty is. Berman’s 
definition of the term is exceptionally broad: “a ‘penalty’ exists when 
the [government] imposes a burden for the purpose of discouraging 
or punishing assertion of a protected right.”157 Because the Tenth 
Amendment gives states a “protected right” to do anything that is 
constitutional and is not preempted by valid federal legislation, and 
because encouragement is the flip side of discouragement, Berman 
treats a federal funding condition as imposing a penalty whenever the 
law has the purpose of “influencing the states’ behavior.”158 
 
 154. See Super, supra note 125, at 2583–84. Professor Super argues, 
In effect, then, disallowing federal conditions on grants to states would be tantamount 
to denying states the ability to contract to perform services for the federal 
government. Whatever problems may attend the current approach, . . . treating states 
as legal incompetents without capacity to enter into binding contracts seems extreme 
and, indeed, quite insulting. 
Id. 
 155. Berman, supra note 136, at 17. 
 156. Id. at 35. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 37. 
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Professor Berman offers no normative justification for treating as 
unconstitutional any conditional-funding statute that, by encouraging 
states to take an action that they have a Tenth Amendment right not 
to take, has the purpose of influencing the states’ behavior. It is 
difficult to conceive of what the justification would be. Just like 
Professor Baker, Professor Berman must explain why the 
Constitution should prohibit states from contracting away some of 
their freedom of action (for a temporary period) in exchange for what 
they deem to be adequate consideration. And the implications of 
Berman’s broad definition of penalty are far-reaching: all conditional 
spending seeks to influence the states’ behavior. Even what Baker 
calls “reimbursement spending” seeks to influence states—if only by 
removing the financial barriers that may otherwise keep states from 
pursuing certain policies. 
Professor Berman seems concerned to avoid these possible 
implications of his proposal. Thus, he insists that, even under his 
analysis, “[r]eimbursement spending is not coercive.”159 And he states 
that in “many” cases, even conditional spending laws that go beyond 
“reimbursement spending” will not be coercive.160 To accommodate 
these conclusions, however, Berman must retreat to what is 
essentially a germaneness analysis: a funding condition is not 
coercive, even if it seeks to influence state behavior, if it is justified by 
“whatever national interests explain[ed] Congress’s willingness to 
extend the offer” of federal funds in the first place.161 Under Berman’s 
analysis, a court should ask whether Congress would have withheld 
funds for violation of a spending condition if it were motivated solely 
by the interests that prompted it to appropriate the funds in the first 
place. If so, the condition is not coercive. Berman suggests that the 
withholding of highway funds in Dole would probably constitute 
coercion under this test, but the withholding of federal education 
funds from states that refuse to prohibit guns in schools might not.162 
At this point, however, Professor Berman’s analysis runs into the 
same problem that has made the nexus limitation so ineffective in 
constraining the conditional spending power: any given appropriation 
will serve multiple interests and have multiple motivations, and 
Congress can spend for any reason it likes. How can a court decide 
 
 159. Id. at 55. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 57. 
 162. See id. at 36–42, 55–56. 
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what was “the” purpose of the spending to which the condition was 
attached? How deeply must a court inquire into Congress’s 
determination that a funding condition serves the same interests as 
the original funding stream? The difficulty in answering these 
questions ties up Berman’s proposal and lends a slicing-the-baloney-
too-thin quality to his application of that proposal to different fact 
patterns.163 Even Professors Baker and Berman acknowledge that 
there might be no “adequately administrable judicial doctrine” that 
satisfactorily implements Berman’s proposal.164 It is doubtful judges 
would even make the effort to create such a doctrine. 
B. The Failure of Motivation 
I have argued that any effort to put muscle into the general 
welfare, nexus, and coercion limitations will require analytically 
embarrassing distinctions. It will also raise serious normative doubts 
in a Court that does not want to appear Lochneresque. But those 
obstacles would be small, indeed, for judges who were intent on 
finding a way to impose real limits on the conditional spending power. 
 
 163. Thus, Professor Berman says there is a possibility that a law conditioning federal 
education funds on a state’s enactment of a law prohibiting guns around schools might not be 
coercive if Congress’s real purpose was not “to punish or deter, but rather to not waste federal 
money” (as it might be if “fear of gun violence had a measurable, deleterious effect on the 
ability of students to learn”). Id. at 55–56. He argues that “[i]n all likelihood, an argument along 
these lines would not, and should not, be credited,” id. at 56, but how is a court supposed to tell? 
And why should it make a difference what Congress’s real purpose is (whatever that means)? 
Berman also argues that federal matching grants are not coercive, even though withholding 
funds directed at certain purposes from states that fail to pitch in their own funds seems like a 
“penalty” based on his definition: “[I]f a state refuses, then whatever national interests explain 
Congress’s willingness to extend the offer are still better served by the contribution than by the 
withholding of federal dollars.” Id. at 57. He explains that 
even if the federal government would actually prefer half the loaf to its next most 
attractive alternative, successful realization of even that partial good is likely to 
require some action by state actors, and Congress might reasonably worry that state 
effort would prove lackadaisical . . . if the state is not itself financially committed. 
Id. at 58. But why doesn’t an analogous argument mean that the federal funding condition in 
Dole was constitutional? Successful realization of the goal of building safe highways is likely to 
require action by state actors, and Congress might reasonably worry that a state that does not 
raise its drinking age to the national standard is not serious about highway safety. And Berman 
endorses what looks like a totally ad hoc exception to his analysis for antidiscrimination laws 
like Section 504: those laws, he says, might be justified by the federal government’s “interests in 
not exacerbating inequality.” Id. But that is an interest tied to the condition, not to the 
underlying grant of funds. By parity of analysis, Congress should be able to justify the condition 
in Dole by pointing to its strong interest in not exacerbating teenage drinking. 
 164. Baker & Berman, supra note 3, at 539 (“Whether an adequately administrable judicial 
doctrine can be crafted to satisfactorily (albeit imperfectly) implement the understandings of 
coercion and penalty . . . are important questions that the court would have to confront . . . .”). 
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When a majority of the Rehnquist Court sought to impose limits on 
Congress’s commerce power, after all, it relied on a distinction 
between “economic” and “non-economic” activity—a distinction that 
approaches analytical incoherence and that has little to recommend it 
normatively.165 If a majority of the Supreme Court wanted to impose 
some limits on the conditional spending power, it could easily speed 
past the normative and analytic problems I have identified. 
Contrary to the views of such scholars as Professors Baker and 
Berman,166 there is little reason to believe that the conservative 
Justices have any desire to impose significant direct limitations on the 
conditional spending power.167 When the Rehnquist Court imposed 
direct limitations on the Commerce power in Lopez and Morrison, it 
was responding in part to the concern that the failure to do so would 
abandon all pretense of limitations on federal power—a concern 
underlined by the solicitor general’s oral argument in Lopez, in which 
he was unable to come up with a single hypothetical statute that 
would be beyond Congress’s commerce authority under his theory.168 
Opponents of the Dole regime often speak of the conditional 
spending power as effectively unlimited,169 but that is not quite right. 
Even in the absence of judicially imposed limits, the conditional 
spending power contains an intrinsic limit that does not constrain 
other federal powers: Congress cannot impose Spending Clause 
regulations on unwilling states; those regulations depend on the 
consent states are willing to give (and Congress’s willingness to find 
the revenue to purchase that consent).170 Even a conservative Court 
 
 165. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610–11 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 559–61 (1995). For criticisms of the economic-noneconomic distinction on analytic and 
normative grounds, see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 643–45 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 656–61 
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 166. See Baker & Berman, supra note 3, at 461. 
 167. Here, I reach conclusions similar to Professor Neil Siegel’s. See Neil S. Siegel, Dole’s 
Future: A Strategic Analysis, 16 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 165, 169–89 (2008). But our analyses, 
although compatible, differ. Whereas Siegel uses game-theory tools and casual observation of 
the Justices’ decisions to support his conclusions, I look to the political stakes in conditional 
spending cases. Those political stakes, I suggest, underlie the behavior Siegel models and 
observes. Professor Simon Lazarus reaches similar conclusions based on his reading of the 
Justice Roberts confirmation hearings. See Lazarus, supra note 23, at 30–31. 
 168. See Young, supra note 14, at 37–38. 
 169. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 3, at 1920 (“[I]f the Spending Clause is simultaneously 
interpreted to permit Congress to seek otherwise forbidden regulatory aims indirectly through a 
conditional offer of federal funds to the states, the notion of ‘a federal government of 
enumerated powers’ will have no meaning.”). 
 170. See Galle, supra note 34, at 169. 
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has reason to be relatively unconcerned with a broad congressional 
power to try to persuade states to agree to spending conditions. 
And there are substantial reasons why a conservative Court 
would hesitate before imposing meaningful direct limitations on the 
spending power. One involves the fear of Lochnerism. Strengthening 
the direct limitations on the conditional spending power will require 
courts to engage in the kind of second-guessing of Congress’s means-
ends judgments that conservative jurists foreswore in the wake of 
Lochner. 
Even aside from their interest in avoiding the appearance of 
judicial activism, conservative judges have strong reasons to defend a 
broad conditional spending power. As Professor Baker never tires of 
pointing out, conditional spending legislation can just as readily be 
used to achieve conservative ends as it can liberal ones.171 And robust 
versions of the nexus and coercion tests could readily be applied 
beyond the context of conditional funding of the states to more 
general unconstitutional conditions cases involving conditional 
funding of individuals and private entities—cases in which these tests 
will be frequently invoked by funding recipients who seek to vindicate 
politically liberal rights claims.172 
If the Court limited Congress to imposing conditions that relate 
directly to some narrowly defined purpose of the money it gives to 
states, it would be hard to keep lower courts from applying the same 
rule to cases in which a federal funding condition implicates the 
constitutionally protected conduct of private entities, for the Court 
 
 171. See supra note 144. 
 172. For examples of a cases in which a conservative court has rejected liberal 
unconstitutional conditions claims that take this form, see Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1313 (2006) (holding that a statute withholding federal 
funds from universities that did not give military recruiters access to students did not violate the 
First Amendment); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 537 (2001) (holding that a 
statute prohibiting recipients of federal legal services funding from challenging welfare laws 
violated the First Amendment); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572–73 
(1998) (concluding that a statute requiring that “general standards of decency and respect for 
the diverse beliefs and values of the American public” be considered in the distribution of 
federal arts funding “neither inherently interferes with First Amendment rights nor violates 
constitutional vagueness principles”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (holding that 
regulations that prohibited federally funded family-planning clinics from abortion counseling 
did not violate the First or Fifth Amendments). For a sense of the conservative political uses to 
which conditional funding of private entities can be put, see David Cole, Beyond 
Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 676–77 (1992). 
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has applied some sort of nexus rule in both contexts.173 And it would 
be even more difficult to avoid applying a beefed-up coercion test to 
cases involving the funding of private entities: if a state—which is a 
large entity with the power to tax—is coerced into accepting federal 
funding conditions, surely a private entity without the power to tax is 
even more coerced. The threat of taking away all of the federal 
funding that goes to a private university if it does not permit military 
recruiters access to its career services facilities174 is at least as coercive 
as the threat of taking away all of a state’s federal special education 
funds if it does not provide educational services to disabled students 
who have been expelled;175 under definitions of coercion that focus on 
whether the recipient had any fair or realistic choice but to accept, the 
university is surely coerced even more than is the state. 
To the extent that conservative Justices want to hold the line on 
private entities’ challenges to conditions on the receipt of federal 
funds, they will resist any effort to strengthen the nexus and coercion 
limitations on conditional spending to states. Indeed, one might 
plausibly attribute Chief Justice Rehnquist’s seemingly incongruous 
opinion in Dole—in which, contrary to the thrust of Rehnquist’s 
federalism jurisprudence, the Court imposed no meaningful 
limitations on Congress’s conditional spending authority176—to a 
strategic concern that the nexus and coercion doctrines cannot be 
effectively cabined to protect states from funding conditions without 
also giving individuals a tool to challenge the conditions on welfare 
benefits and other government funding they receive. 
Finally, wholly aside from these sorts of rule-consequentialist 
concerns, a robust coercion limitation seems, ideologically, more in 
tune with liberal than with conservative jurisprudential style. The 
notion that coercion can extend beyond the physical, and that the law 
should take account of the pressures that make an individual unable, 
as a practical matter, to resist a given course of action, is a notion that 
is generally associated with the liberal position on a number of 
doctrinal issues: broad duress defenses in criminal law;177 narrow 
 
 173. See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 197–98 (applying such a test in an individual’s First 
Amendment “unconstitutional conditions” challenge). 
 174. See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1313. 
 175. See Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 560 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per 
curiam). 
 176. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 177. See Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A Justification, 
Not an Excuse—And Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 862 (2003) (“Liberals . . . wish 
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notions of voluntary confessions, consent to searches, or waiver of 
constitutional rights;178 expansive notions of unconscionability in 
contract;179 and so forth. In each of these contexts, and many others, it 
is liberals who urge that the doctrine should take an empathic view 
that acknowledges the many pressures on one’s choices, and it is 
conservatives who take a thinner, more individualistic view of free 
choice.180 If conservative judges are to adopt a strict coercion 
limitation on conditional spending, however, they will be forced to 
argue for the sort of empathic view of choice that they typically reject. 
They will be forced to argue that states have no real choice but to 
take federal money, even though “nobody is putting a gun to the 
state’s head.” Many conservatives are likely to see such an argument 
as so inconsistent with their typical jurisprudential views as to be 
undesirable.181 
II.  THE POSSIBILITIES OF INDIRECT LIMITATIONS 
In the previous Part, I argue that the Supreme Court is unlikely, 
in the foreseeable future, to impose meaningful direct limitations on 
Congress’s conditional spending power. But it is far more likely to 
impose indirect limitations—limitations that do not prohibit Congress 
from imposing substantive rules on the states through the conditional 
spending power, but that either raise the cost of doing so or make it 
difficult to enforce the rules Congress imposes. One such limitation—
the notion that conditions on federal spending are not “law” but are 
merely contractual obligations—has not fared well in the courts, but it 
may have brighter prospects in the future. I discuss that limitation in 
Section A. As I show in Section B, the Supreme Court and some 
lower courts have already used another such limitation—the 
requirement that federal spending legislation give states clear notice 
 
to expand the defense to encompass responses to ‘situational duress,’ that is, to natural threats 
that persons of reasonable firmness would be unable to resist.”). 
 178. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 278 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 179. See Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87, 118 (1999) 
(describing the role of liberal judges in spreading the unconscionability doctrine). 
 180. Professor Mark Kelman aptly notes that “[i]t is generally easy, in fact, to locate people 
on our traditional political spectrum by ascertaining to what extent they are committed to 
describing life in those spheres ‘unregulated’ by the state as free, chosen.” MARK KELMAN, A 
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 102 (1987). 
 181. For one account of how this process might work in a private-law context, compare this 
to Duncan Kennedy, The Political Stakes in “Merely Technical” Issues of Contract Law, 10 EUR. 
REV. PRIVATE L. 7, 13–18, 25 (2001). 
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of the conditions attached to it—with great frequency. Because both 
the assertion that spending conditions are not law and the notice 
requirement derive from the notion that conditional spending is (or is 
in the nature of) a contract, I call these indirect limitations “contract 
theories.” I call the principle that spending conditions are not law the 
“strong contract theory,” and I call the notice requirement the “weak 
contract theory.” 
I argue that, as a normative matter, the Court should not adopt 
either the strong or the weak contract theory. But, as a predictive 
matter, the Court is nearly certain to continue to implement the weak 
contract theory, and there is a chance (though not a big one) that it 
will adopt the strong contract theory. Unlike the general welfare, 
notice, and coercion limitations, the indirect limitations offered by the 
two contract theories do not put courts in the Lochneresque position 
of appearing to second-guess Congress’s policy judgments, nor do 
those indirect limitations lead to especial analytic embarrassment. 
Perhaps most importantly, the two contract theories do not bar the 
types of conditional spending legislation that conservatives favor, and 
they need not lead to liberal results in the sorts of unconstitutional 
conditions cases in which conservatives defend spending conditions. 
A conservative Court can therefore employ the contract theories to 
limit the reach and enforceability of conditional spending legislation 
passed by more liberal Congresses without threatening any particular 
harm to legislation passed by more conservative Congresses. 
A. Unenforceability and the Strong Contract Theory 
The strong contract theory begins with the notion that 
“legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the 
nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to 
comply with federally imposed conditions.”182 But to proponents of 
that theory, conditional spending legislation is not just “in the nature 
of” a contract; it is nothing but a contract. As I show in Section A.1, 
the strong contract theory would substantially limit the enforceability 
of spending conditions. Although a number of individual judges have 
pressed versions of the theory in various opinions, I show in Section 
A.2 that their positions have not prevailed. In Section A.3, I argue 
against the strong contract theory, and suggest some reasons why, 
though it is possible that a conservative court would use that theory to 
 
 182. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
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restrict Congress’s conditional spending power, it is not especially 
likely. 
1. The Theory.  The strong contract theory is straightforward, if 
radical. The theory posits that the spending power is not an 
enumerated legislative power, so the ordinary accoutrements of 
legislative power do not extend to laws passed pursuant to that 
power. As Professor David Engdahl, the leading academic exponent 
of the strong contract theory, explains: 
[C]ongress’ power to spend money is not a legislative power. Our 
Constitution does contemplate—and in some instances, even 
specifies—that Congress will have certain non-legislative powers. 
The power to spend—like the powers to receive and hold property, 
to make contracts, and to sue for injuries like trespass and waste—
inhere in every body politic as an artificial person . . . .183 
Engdahl recognizes that the conditions accompanying the receipt of 
federal funds “are specified by Congress in statutory form,” but he 
argues that “they are not statutory in their effect: They have no force 
at all as ‘law,’ but rather are binding, if at all, only by virtue of 
contract.”184 
For Professor Engdahl, the contractual nature of conditional 
spending legislation has a few key consequences. Because spending 
conditions are not “law,” Congress cannot invoke the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to effectuate the purposes of those conditions,185 nor 
can those conditions preempt inconsistent state laws under the 
Supremacy Clause.186 And private parties cannot challenge state 
violations of spending conditions under § 1983, because that statute is 
limited to enforcing “rights ‘secured by’ federal ‘laws.’”187 In 
Engdahl’s view, “third-party rights” under conditional spending 
legislation “are ‘secured’ (if at all) not by any ‘law,’ but only by the 
contract between the recipient and the United States, and section 
 
 183. Engdahl, supra note 127, at 498–99 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
 184. Id. at 500 (emphasis omitted). 
 185. See Engdahl, supra note 34, at 18–24 (“Congress thus may pursue policy objects 
regarding extraneous matters, those policies remain extraneous to the enumerated powers; 
therefore, those policies cannot invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause, which avails only for 
effectuating ends within the enumerated powers.”). 
 186. See id. at 20–24, 62–78 (“[E]xtraneous objectives being promoted by taxing, by 
spending, or by manipulating any other enumerated power may freely be frustrated or 
countermanded by states.”). 
 187. Id. at 104 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)). 
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1983 does not even remotely contemplate causes of action for 
contract violations.”188 For the same reason, the strong contract theory 
would bar private parties from suing to enforce spending conditions 
under the doctrine of Ex parte Young.189 That doctrine “gives life to 
the Supremacy Clause” by authorizing prospective remedies that are 
“designed to end a continuing violation of federal law.”190 If spending 
conditions are not “law,” there is no basis for applying the Ex parte 
Young doctrine to enforce them.191 
2. The Failure (So Far) in the Cases.  In a 2007 article, Professor 
Engdahl asserts that “adherents of the contract thesis of the spending 
power”—by which he appears to mean the strong contract theory I 
discuss here—“currently comprise a thin, but relatively young and 
vigorous, majority of the Supreme Court,” and that there is thus 
“good reason to expect important additional developments, at least 
with regard to third-party beneficiary actions.”192 But although a few 
Justices have endorsed aspects of the strong contract theory in 
concurring or dissenting opinions, they have not persuaded a majority 
to go along. And the courts of appeals have uniformly rejected that 
theory. 
Concurring in Blessing v. Freestone193—a case that reversed the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding that § 1983 can be used to enforce Title IV-D 
of the Social Security Act194—Justice Scalia suggested some sympathy 
with the strong contract theory. In his opinion, which Justice Kennedy 
joined, Justice Scalia went out of his way to observe that the Court’s 
disposition of the case made it “unnecessary to reach the question 
whether § 1983 ever authorizes the beneficiaries of a federal-state 
funding and spending agreement—such as Title IV-D—to bring 
suit.”195 He noted that it “appears to have been the law at the time  
§ 1983 was enacted”196 that a third-party beneficiary was “regarded as 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
 190. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). 
 191. See Engdahl, supra note 127, at 534 n.266 (citing favorably the district court’s decision 
in Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 561–89 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev’d, 289 F.3d 
852 (6th Cir. 2002), which held that spending conditions could not be enforced under § 1983 or 
Ex parte Young). 
 192. Engdahl, supra note 127, at 527. 
 193. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997). 
 194. Id. at 333. 
 195. Id. at 349 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 196. Id. at 350. 
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a stranger to the contract, and could not sue upon it.”197 He therefore 
declared himself open to the argument that conditional spending laws 
do not “secure” any rights in third-party beneficiaries for purposes of 
§ 1983.198 Concurring in the judgment in a later case, Justice Thomas 
stated that the “contract analogy raises serious questions as to 
whether third parties may sue to enforce Spending Clause 
legislation—through pre-emption or otherwise,” though he declined 
to reach the questions because the parties had not raised them.199 
But even in those cases, Justices Scalia and Thomas did not 
suggest that they would fully endorse the strong contract theory. That 
theory, after all, denies Congress the power to make spending 
conditions enforceable against states by third parties. But in his 
Blessing concurrence, Justice Scalia suggested that his position was 
rooted in statutory interpretation—that “the understanding of § 1983 
when it was enacted” incorporated the then-dominant rule that third-
party beneficiaries could not sue to enforce a contract.200 And in his 
Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh201 
opinion, Justice Thomas seemed to say that Congress had the power 
to give third parties a private right of action to enforce conditional 
spending laws.202 
And in other cases, majorities of the Court (joined, in most cases, 
by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas), have rejected key 
components of the strong contract theory. In Barnes v. Gorman,203 
which I discuss in Section B.1.a as an example of the Court employing 
the weak contract theory, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion expressly 
disclaimed any implication “that suits under Spending Clause 
 
 197. Id. at 349. 
 198. See id. at 349–50. 
 199. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 683 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 200. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 350 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 201. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003). 
 202. See id. at 683 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
Under this Court’s precedents, private parties may employ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or an 
implied private right of action only if they demonstrate an “unambiguously conferred 
right.” Petitioner quite obviously cannot satisfy this requirement and therefore 
arguably is not entitled to bring a pre-emption lawsuit as a third-party beneficiary to 
the Medicaid contract. . . . [W]ere the issue to be raised, I would give careful 
consideration to whether Spending Clause legislation can be enforced by third parties 
in the absence of a private right of action. 
Id. 
 203. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002). 
BAGENSTOS IN FINAL2.DOC 11/16/2008  9:58:47 PM 
2008] SPENDING CLAUSE LITIGATION 389 
legislation are suits in contract, or that contract-law principles apply 
to all issues that they raise.”204 In Frew v. Hawkins,205 Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for a unanimous Court upheld enforcement of a 
consent decree that Texas officials had entered into with private 
plaintiffs to resolve a claim that the state was violating its obligations 
under the Medicaid program (a conditional spending program).206 
Although the strong contract theory would provide that Medicaid 
obligations are not “law,” the Court stated that the consent decree 
enforcing those obligations was “a federal decree entered to 
implement a federal statute” and thus was “consistent with Ex parte 
Young.”207 
And in Sabri v. United States,208 the Court upheld a criminal 
prohibition on bribery in entities that receive federal funds.209 The 
Court explained that Congress had power, under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, “to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under 
[the spending] power are in fact spent for the general welfare.”210 
Although the strong contract theory would hold that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause is inapplicable to the spending power, and that 
conditional spending laws accordingly cannot bind third parties, every 
Justice but Justice Thomas signed onto the majority opinion. Justice 
Thomas voted to uphold the statute on Commerce Clause grounds 
and thus did not reach the question “whether Congress’ power to 
spend combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause could 
authorize the enactment of” the statute before the Court.211 He did 
not, however, challenge the proposition that Congress may use the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to support legislation enacted pursuant 
to the spending power. He merely “f[ou]nd questionable the scope 
the Court g[ave] to the Necessary and Proper Clause as applied to 
Congress’ authority to spend,” with a particular focus on the Court’s 
application of the nexus requirement.212 
 
 204. Id. at 188–89 n.2. Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s opinion for the 
Court. 
 205. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004). 
 206. Id. at 436–37. 
 207. Id. at 439. 
 208. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004). 
 209. Id. at 602. 
 210. Id. at 605. 
 211. Id. at 614 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 212. Id. at 611 (emphasis added). 
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In recent years, only one lower court has endorsed the strong 
contract theory: the Eastern District of Michigan, in Westside Mothers 
v. Haveman.213 But the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision in that case and held that conditional spending legislation, 
rather than being merely a contract, is the supreme law of the land 
and is enforceable under both § 1983 and Ex parte Young.214 And the 
other courts of appeals to confront the question have rejected the 
district court’s Westside Mothers holding as well.215 To this point, the 
strong contract theory has not been successful in the courts. 
3. Assessment.  Despite Professor Engdahl’s optimism, I think it 
quite unlikely that the Supreme Court will adopt the strong contract 
theory any time soon. The major problem is that too much precedent 
stands in the way. Although the Court has never squarely confronted 
the argument that the conditional spending power is not a 
“legislative” power, it has decided a number of cases that are 
inconsistent with the strong contract theory. As Engdahl 
acknowledges,216 the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that 
conditional spending statutes preempt inconsistent state legislation 
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.217 That is true even in cases in 
which the state is not a party to the contract created by the spending 
statute (as when a state law permits the attachment of funds received 
by private parties as Social Security or Veterans’ Administration 
benefits).218 And, as discussed in Section A.2, the Court has held that 
 
 213. Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 587–88 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (holding 
that state obligations under the Medicaid statute are not “law” for purposes of the Supremacy 
Clause and may not be enforced under § 1983 or Ex parte Young), rev’d, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 
2002). 
 214. Westside Mothers, 289 F.3d at 860, 862–63. 
 215. See, e.g., Frazar v. Hawkins, 376 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that the panel had 
“rejected” the “so-called Westside Mothers arguments” in a previous appeal); Mo. Child Care 
Ass’n v. Cross, 294 F.3d 1034, 1040 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e have found no other decision in which 
any federal court of appeals has held that legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’s Spending 
Clause powers is not part of the supreme law of the land. We agree with the Sixth Circuit’s 
reasoned rejection of this argument and likewise reject the argument here.” (citation omitted)); 
Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 188 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting an argument in line with the 
district court’s ruling in Westside Mothers as a “novel position” that was “at odds with existing, 
binding precedent”). 
 216. See Engdahl, supra note 34, at 62–78. 
 217. Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 138 (1982); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598, 604 
(1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971). 
 218. See Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395, 396 (1988) (per curiam) (holding that an 
Arkansas statute, which permits the state to seize prisoners’ property to defray the costs of their 
incarceration, is preempted to the extent that it is applied to seize property received as Social 
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Congress has power, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, to 
regulate (and indeed impose criminal liability on) third parties whose 
actions might interfere with the administration of federally funded 
state programs.219 The Court has also, on three occasions, held that 
particular conditional spending statutes were “laws” that “secured” 
rights in private parties for purposes of § 1983.220 
It is possible that the Court could say that the validity of the 
strong contract theory was not squarely presented in any of these 
cases. But in each one, an essential part of the Court’s analysis and 
holding was directly inconsistent with the notion that conditional 
spending statutes are not “law” but are merely contract. I doubt the 
Court would adopt a rule that flies in the face of so much precedent. 
Precedent aside, there are substantial problems with the strong 
contract theory. Conditional spending statutes are no less “law” than 
any other kind of federal legislation.221 Like all other federal 
legislation, they must go through the Article I, Section 7 process of 
bicameralism and presentment. To be sure, the obligations they 
impose on a state depend on satisfaction of a condition subsequent—
the state’s acceptance of the conditional offer of federal funds—but 
that fact does not make their obligations any less binding (or any less 
a product of “law”) than the obligations imposed by any other federal 
statute. As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has explained, “[a] State 
certainly gets to decide whether to participate in a federal program 
like Medicaid; but once it has made the choice to participate, it must 
comply with the terms of that law, just as it must follow all federal 
laws that apply to it.”222 
It bears emphasis that Professor Engdahl’s theory is not merely a 
rule for interpreting Spending Clause statutes—a rule, for example, 
that courts should read those statutes as not authorizing private rights 
 
Security or benefits); see also Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 417 (1973) 
(holding that the Social Security Act bars the State of New Jersey from attaching Social Security 
benefits as reimbursements for state welfare payments). 
 219. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004). 
 220. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1990) (Boren Amendment to 
Medicaid Act); Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 432 
(1987) (Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act of 1937); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 
(1980) (Aid to Families with Dependent Children Provisions of the Social Security Act). 
 221. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ensuring the Supremacy of Federal Law: Why the District 
Court was Wrong in Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 139, 145 (2002) 
(“Nothing in the Constitution’s language, or any Supreme Court precedent, draws a distinction 
among federal laws, denying some status as the supreme law of the land.”). 
 222. Id. at 146. 
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of action or having preemptive effect unless Congress specifies 
otherwise. Such a rule would be an instantiation of the weak contract 
theory, which I discuss below. Engdahl’s strong contract theory 
would, as a matter of constitutional law, bar Congress from giving a 
Spending Clause statute preemptive effect, authorizing a private right 
of action for its violation, and enacting additional laws necessary and 
proper to carrying it out. To justify that position, Engdahl must 
answer the question why this congressional power is different from all 
other congressional powers. Engdahl answers the question by 
asserting that, unlike the other powers, the spending power is not an 
enumerated legislative power.223 If the spending power is not such a 
power, he contends, it is not one of the “Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States”224 for purposes 
of the Necessary and Proper Clause.225 Nor is a conditional spending 
statute “supreme Law of the Land,”226 because it is not a law “made in 
Pursuance”227 of the Constitution.228 
But, as Professor Engdahl himself acknowledges,229 the Supreme 
Court has long held that the spending power is enumerated in the 
General Welfare Clause of Article I, Section 8—the section that sets 
forth most of Congress’s legislative powers.230 And even Alexander 
Hamilton—a signer of the Constitution, one of the most important 
Founders, and the person whose understanding of the spending 
power has been accepted as correct by both the Supreme Court and 
Engdahl himself—described the General Welfare Clause as the 
source of Congress’s spending power.231 
Once one accepts the premise that the General Welfare Clause is 
the source of Congress’s spending power, Professor Engdahl’s 
argument falls apart. The General Welfare Clause, after all, is also the 
 
 223. See Engdahl, supra note 127, at 498–500. 
 224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 225. See Engdahl, supra note 34, at 18. 
 226. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Engdahl, supra note 34, at 20. 
 229. See id. at 49–50. 
 230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the Common Defence and general 
Welfare of the United States.”); see, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987) 
(citing cases); see also Galle, supra note 34, at 168 (making this point about Professor Engdahl’s 
argument). 
 231. See Engdahl, supra note 34, at 53 (“It is true that even Hamilton attributed the 
spending power to the Taxing Clause.”). 
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source of Congress’s taxing power—a power that no one can doubt is 
legislative. There is no textual basis in the General Welfare Clause, 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, or the Supremacy Clause for 
treating the taxing and spending powers as lacking the entailments of 
other congressional powers. It would be surprising if a conservative 
court upended so much precedent to adopt a purportedly textual 
interpretation of the Constitution that seems so inconsistent with 
both the text and the original understanding. 
B. Notice—The Weak Contract Theory 
In his opinion for the Court in Pennhurst State School and 
Hospital v. Halderman,232 then–Associate Justice Rehnquist did not 
draw a contractual analogy to support Professor Engdahl’s strong 
contract theory. Instead, he drew that analogy to support a notice 
requirement: 
[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the 
nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to 
comply with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of 
Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on 
whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 
“contract.” There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a 
State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is 
expected of it.233 
“Accordingly,” the Court concluded, “if Congress intends to impose a 
condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so 
unambiguously. By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice, 
we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of 
the consequences of their participation.”234 The Court applied that 
rule to hold that the “least restrictive” language of the 
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975 
did not impose judicially enforceable obligations on the states. That 
language, which appeared in a statutory “finding,” stated that 
“treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental 
disabilities should be designed to maximize the developmental 
potential of the person and should be provided in the setting that is 
 
 232. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
 233. Id. at 17 (citations omitted). 
 234. Id. (citations omitted). 
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least restrictive of the person’s personal liberty.”235 The Court 
explained that “[i]t is difficult to know what is meant by providing 
‘appropriate treatment’ in the ‘least restrictive’ setting, and it is 
unlikely that a State would have accepted federal funds had it known 
it would be bound to” such a “largely indeterminate” obligation.236 
And the placement of the “appropriate treatment” and “least 
restrictive setting” language in a general statement of “findings” fell 
“well short of providing clear notice to the States that they, by 
accepting funds under the Act, would indeed be obligated to comply 
with” that language.237 
Although Pennhurst seems like a straightforward application of 
the clear-statement rule that the Court often invokes in cases in which 
federal legislation alters the federal-state balance,238 both the Supreme 
Court and lower courts have gone well beyond ordinary clear-
statement principles in applying the notice rule to conditional 
spending cases. As I show in Section B.1, courts have applied that 
rule to require a variety of different sorts of notice and have thereby 
significantly limited the enforceability of a number of important 
federal spending conditions. Although the Rehnquist Court passed up 
some opportunities to apply an even more stringent notice rule, the 
possibility remains a very live one. In Section B.2, I assess the 
likelihood that the Roberts Court will take up that possibility. 
Although there are substantial normative objections to applying a 
super-strong clear-statement rule to conditional spending legislation, 
I conclude that the Court will likely apply just such a rule to a greater 
and greater extent in the near future. 
1. Possibilities and Limits in the Cases.  Cases in the Supreme 
Court and the lower courts have interpreted the Spending Clause 
notice requirement as (more or less stringently) demanding that 
funding recipients receive three different types of notice before being 
held liable for violation of a funding condition: (a) notice of the 
remedy for violation of a funding condition, (b) notice of how the 
substantive rule imposed by that condition applies to particular facts, 
and (c) notice of the facts in a given case that violate that condition. 
 
 235. Id. at 13 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976)). 
 236. Id. at 24–25. 
 237. Id. at 25. 
 238. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. 
REV. 125, 189 (treating the Pennhurst-derived notice principle as “just a clear statement rule, 
that functions here just as any clear statement rule”). 
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Each of these applications of the notice rule derives in some way from 
the holding and discussion in Pennhurst. 
 a. Notice of the Remedy.  In a number of cases, the Court has 
applied Pennhurst to hold that particular remedies will not be 
available for violation of a funding condition unless the states were on 
notice that those remedies would be available at the time they agreed 
to accept the federal money. For example, in Gonzaga University v. 
Doe,239 the Court held that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act could not be enforced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.240 The Court relied 
on Pennhurst’s statement that “[i]n legislation enacted pursuant to 
the spending power, the typical remedy for state noncompliance with 
federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for 
noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to 
terminate funds to the State,”241 and its holding that “unless Congress 
‘speak[s] with a clear voice,’ and manifests an ‘unambiguous’ intent to 
confer individual rights, federal funding provisions provide no basis 
for private enforcement by § 1983.”242 Applying these principles, the 
Gonzaga Court held that the statute’s institutionally focused 
language—which prohibits the Department of Education from 
funding an educational institution with a “policy or practice of 
permitting the release of education records”—did not unambiguously 
give individual students the right to be free from the release of their 
records.243 
In Barnes v. Gorman, the Court applied the same principle to 
hold that, even when a private right of action to enforce a piece of 
conditional spending legislation exists, plaintiffs may not recover 
punitive damages unless the statute specifically put recipient states on 
notice of the availability of that remedy.244 The Court explained that, 
when conditional spending legislation gives individuals a right of 
action, a state that receives funds “is generally on notice that it is 
subject not only to those remedies explicitly provided in the relevant 
legislation, but also to those remedies traditionally available in suits 
for breach of contract.”245 But punitive damages are not traditionally 
 
 239. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). 
 240. Id. at 276. 
 241. Id. at 280 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28). 
 242. Id. (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17, 28). 
 243. Id. at 287–88 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2000)). 
 244. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185–88 (2002). 
 245. Id. at 187. 
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available for breaches of contract.246 Moreover, the Court concluded, 
it is unlikely that a state would ever agree to accept federal funds if 
doing so exposed it “to such unorthodox and indeterminate 
liability.”247 In Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. 
Murphy, which I discussed in the Introduction,248 the Court used the 
same sort of analysis to conclude that the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act’s fee-shifting provision—which entitles prevailing 
parents to recover “reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” in 
proceedings to enforce the statute249—did not put states on notice that 
they would be liable to pay those parents’ expert fees.250 
The most extreme application of the notice-of-remedy 
requirement appears in the Second Circuit’s decision in Garcia v. 
S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center.251 The case involved Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act,252 which prohibits disability discrimination by 
recipients of federal funds253 and provides that states that receive 
federal funds must waive their sovereign immunity against claims 
under the statute.254 The Second Circuit agreed that the statutory 
language “constitutes a clear expression of Congress’s intent to 
condition acceptance of federal funds on a state’s waiver of its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.”255 But it concluded that New York 
had not knowingly waived its sovereign immunity against 
Rehabilitation Act claims when it accepted federal funds from 1993 to 
1995 (when the dispute in Garcia arose).256 
The Garcia court’s reasoning was somewhat convoluted: Title II 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (which became effective in 
1992)257 imposes on all states the same substantive obligations that the 
Rehabilitation Act places on recipients of federal funds,258 and the 
ADA contains a provision that expressly abrogates state sovereign 
 
 246. See id. at 187–88. 
 247. Id. at 188. 
 248. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. 
 249. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006). 
 250. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2459–61 (2006). 
 251. Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 252. Id. at 104. 
 253. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006). 
 254. See id. § 794a; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (2000). 
 255. Garcia, 280 F.3d at 113. 
 256. Id. at 114. 
 257. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336, § 205(a), 104 Stat. 327, 338 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2000)). 
 258. See id. §§ 12131(1), 12134(b), 12201(a). 
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immunity259—although the Supreme Court held that provision 
unconstitutional in at least some cases in Board of Trustees v. 
Garrett.260 If the ADA’s abrogation of sovereign immunity was 
unconstitutional as a whole—as Garrett might have been read to 
suggest—the Rehabilitation Act’s requirement of waiver would, to be 
sure, have a significant legal effect. But between the effective date of 
the ADA and the Garrett decision, “a state accepting conditioned 
federal funds could not have understood that in doing so it was 
actually abandoning its sovereign immunity from private damages 
suits [because] by all reasonable appearances, state sovereign 
immunity had already been lost.”261 In other words, Garcia held that 
spending-power legislation must give states notice not just of the 
formal legal consequences of any conditions attached to the receipt of 
funds but also of the baseline legal regime and the incremental change 
the conditions make to it. A panel of the Fifth Circuit followed 
Garcia in holding that the state’s acceptance of federal funds prior to 
a 2001 case in which that court held the ADA’s abrogation of 
sovereign immunity unconstitutional262 “did not manifest a knowing 
waiver of that which they could not know they had the power to 
waive.”263 The panel’s ruling on that point was overturned en banc, 
however.264 Except for the Fifth Circuit’s panel decision, courts 
outside of the Second Circuit have rejected the Garcia requirement of 
notice of incremental legal effect.265 But the Second Circuit’s 
formulation illustrates the lengths to which the notice-of-remedies 
requirement can be pushed. 
 b. Notice of How the Substantive Rule Applies to Particular Facts.  
Some courts have read Pennhurst as requiring that spending 
legislation set forth the conditions attached to it with greater 
 
 259. Id. § 12202. 
 260. See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368–74 (2001). 
 261. Garcia, 280 F.3d at 114 (citation omitted) (citing Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999)). 
 262. The case was Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974, 976 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 263. Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 325 F.3d 609, 616–17 (5th Cir. 2003), rev’d en banc, 403 
F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 264. See Pace, 403 F.3d at 277. 
 265. See Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors, 411 F.3d 474, 495 (4th Cir. 2005); Barbour v. 
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 374 F.3d 1161, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Nieves-Márquez v. 
Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 129–30 (1st Cir. 2003); Doe v. Nebraska, 345 F.3d 593, 601–04 (8th 
Cir. 2003); A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 341 F.3d 234, 250–54 (3d Cir. 2003); Garrett v. Univ. of 
Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 344 F.3d 1288, 1292–93 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). 
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precision than is normally demanded of federal laws. Unless the state 
receiving federal funds has notice of how the substantive obligation 
imposed on it applies to particular fact settings, these courts rule, the 
condition is invalid (or at least cannot be enforced in a private 
damages action). The Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision in Virginia 
Department of Education v. Riley offers an example. In Riley, the 
court addressed the question whether a state may refuse to educate a 
student with a disability who is expelled from school for reasons 
unrelated to that student’s disability.266 The statute, as written at the 
time, required that states receiving federal funds “ha[ve] in effect a 
policy that assures all children with disabilities the right to a free 
appropriate public education.”267 
Because the statute guaranteed all children with disabilities “the 
right to” education, but it did not expressly disclaim the proposition 
that a student may waive that right by misconduct, the court 
concluded that the statute did not clearly require the state to educate 
students with disabilities who had been expelled for non-disability-
related misconduct: 
Applying the clear statement rule with the required solicitude for 
the rights of the States in our federalist system, it is apparent that 
Congress has not spoken through the IDEA with anywhere near the 
clarity and the degree of specificity required for us to conclude that 
the States’ receipt of special education funds is conditioned upon 
their continued provision of education to handicapped students 
expelled for criminal activity or other misconduct unrelated to their 
disabilities. The majority is unable to cite to a single word from the 
statute or from the legislative history of IDEA evidencing that 
Congress even considered such a condition, much less that it 
confronted the possibility of such a condition and its implications for 
the sovereignty of the States, and determined to condition the 
States’ funds in this manner.268 
The Riley court thus concluded that Congress’s failure to disclaim an 
exception from a broad general statute created an ambiguity that the 
court was required to read in the state’s favor by treating the statute 
as in fact containing that exception.269 Needless to say, that is not the 
 
 266. Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 560 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 267. Id. at 563 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1)). 
 268. Id. at 567. The opinion refers to “the majority” because the Fourth Circuit sitting en 
banc simply adopted Judge Luttig’s panel dissent as its opinion on this point. Id. at 560–61. 
 269. Id. at 567–68. 
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ordinary practice in interpreting statutes outside of the conditional 
spending context.270 
In his opinion in Guardians Association v. Civil Service 
Commission,271 Justice White applied the same principle to require 
Spending Clause legislation to be framed in relatively rulelike form to 
authorize damages liability. Guardians involved a claim of disparate-
impact discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.272 Justice White (whose opinion was controlling on this point) 
held that, because Title VI “is spending-power legislation,” funding 
recipients could not be liable to pay damages for violating the 
statute’s disparate impact prohibition.273 When that prohibition is at 
issue, Justice White explained, “it is not immediately obvious what 
the grantee’s obligations under the federal program were and it is 
surely not obvious that the grantee was aware that it was 
administering the program in violation of the statute or 
regulations.”274 
The Supreme Court has not been consistent in requiring that 
states get such precise notice of the obligations that they undertake 
when receiving federal funds, however. Indeed, in Bennett v. 
Kentucky Department of Education,275 the Court held that Pennhurst 
does not require “every improper expenditure” of federal funds to be 
“specifically identified and proscribed in advance.”276 And two 5–4 
decisions in the late Rehnquist Court—Davis v. Monroe County 
Board of Education,277 and Jackson v. Birmingham Board of 
Education278—strongly undercut the notion that Congress must give 
states precise notice of how spending conditions apply to particular 
facts. 
In Davis, the Court (speaking through Justice O’Connor) held 
that the test for student-on-student sexual harassment under Title IX 
of the Education Amendments was sufficiently clear to permit a 
 
 270. Cf. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (“[T]he fact that a statute can 
be applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. 
It demonstrates breadth.” (quoting Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985))). 
 271. Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
 272. Id. at 586 (opinion of White, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). 
 273. Id. at 598–99. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656 (1985). 
 276. Id. at 666. 
 277. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
 278. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005). 
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damages award.279 That was true even though the test was phrased in 
quite general terms—actionable harassment must be “so severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the 
victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided 
by the school.”280 Indeed, the Court itself acknowledged that 
“[w]hether gender-oriented conduct rises to the level of actionable 
‘harassment’ . . . ‘depends on a constellation of surrounding 
circumstances, expectations, and relationships,’ including, but not 
limited to, the ages of the harasser and the victim and the number of 
individuals involved.”281 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy 
criticized the Court for failing to “explain how a school is supposed to 
discern from this mishmash of factors what is actionable 
discrimination.”282 The Court’s “multifactored balancing test,” he 
concluded, “is a far cry from the clarity we demand of Spending 
Clause legislation.”283 
In Jackson, the Court (also speaking through Justice O’Connor) 
held that Title IX prohibits retaliation even though its text prohibits 
only “discrimination” that is “on the basis of sex.”284 The Court 
explained that “the [defendant School] Board should have been put 
on notice by the fact that our cases . . . have consistently interpreted 
Title IX’s private cause of action broadly to encompass diverse forms 
of intentional sex discrimination.”285 Moreover, the Court explained, 
regulations prohibiting retaliation under Title IX had “been on the 
books for nearly 30 years,” and “the Courts of Appeals that had 
considered the question at the time of the conduct at issue” had all 
“interpreted Title IX to cover retaliation.”286 In dissent, Justice 
Thomas argued (quite plausibly) that “discrimination on the basis of 
sex” does not clearly encompass retaliation for complaining about 
sex-based discrimination, that no prior Supreme Court case had held 
that retaliation was one of the “diverse forms of intentional sex 
 
 279. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 651 (citation omitted) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 
U.S. 75, 82 (1998)). 
 282. Id. at 675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 283. Id. 
 284. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 
1681(a) (2000)). 
 285. Id. at 183. 
 286. Id. 
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discrimination” covered by the statute, and that the relevant 
regulation did not state that Title IX itself prohibited retaliation.287 
But although Justice Kennedy spoke in dissent in Davis, and 
Justice Thomas spoke in dissent in Jackson, their position could well 
be the majority one on the Roberts Court. Davis and Jackson were 5–
4 decisions, in which Justice O’Connor joined Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer to make a majority.288 Justice Alito, who 
replaced Justice O’Connor, wrote for the Court in Arlington 
Central.289 The gratuitous discussion of the requirement for clear 
notice in his opinion for the Court in that case suggests, even if it does 
not prove, that Justice Alito embraces a robust understanding of the 
Pennhurst notice doctrine.290 Had he been on the Court at the time 
Davis and Jackson were decided, those cases could easily have come 
out the other way.291 
 c. Notice of the Facts that Violate the Condition.  In two cases, the 
Supreme Court has read Pennhurst as at least presumptively barring a 
damages remedy for “unintentional” violations of spending 
conditions. In so doing, the Court has effectively extended the notice 
principle to demand that the funding recipient have notice of the facts 
that violated the spending condition at issue—at the time of 
violation—to be held liable in damages. 
The Court first suggested this reading of Pennhurst, by negative 
implication, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools.292 In that 
case, the Court rejected the argument that Pennhurst barred 
monetary relief under Title IX for teacher-on-student sexual 
harassment. The Court explained, “The point of not permitting 
monetary damages for an unintentional violation is that the receiving 
entity of federal funds lacks notice that it will be liable for a monetary 
award. This notice problem does not arise in a case such as this, in 
which intentional discrimination is alleged.”293 The Court pointed to 
 
 287. Id. at 190–92 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 288. Id. at 169 (majority opinion); Davis, 526 U.S. at 632. 
 289. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2457 (2006). 
 290. See id. at 2459–63 (holding that the Spending Clause requires Congress to give clear 
notice to the states when attaching conditions to the acceptance of federal funds). 
 291. For a similar assessment of the effects of Justice O’Connor’s replacement by Justice 
Alito, see Engdahl, supra note 127, at 523–26. 
 292. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
 293. Id. at 74–75 (citation omitted). 
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Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone294—a Section 504 case that itself 
relied on Justice White’s controlling opinion in Guardians295—as 
“bel[ying]” the “notion that Spending Clause statutes do not 
authorize monetary awards for intentional violations.”296 Franklin 
thus held that Spending Clause statutes can authorize monetary relief 
for intentional violations of funding conditions.297 But it also suggested 
that the notice principle implies that such statutes will not authorize 
monetary relief for unintentional violations.298 The Court confirmed 
that suggestion, but also made clear that it rests on an inference about 
what Congress would have intended, in Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Independent School District.299 
Like Franklin, Gebser was a Title IX case involving teacher-on-
student sexual harassment.300 Franklin had held that a school district 
can under some circumstances be liable under the statute for a 
teacher’s sexual harassment of a student,301 but it had not addressed 
the circumstances in which the district’s liability would attach. The 
plaintiff in Gebser argued that the school district should be liable for a 
teacher’s harassment under either a respondeat superior or a 
constructive notice theory,302 but the Court rejected those arguments. 
“If a school district’s liability for a teacher’s sexual harassment rests 
on principles of constructive notice or respondeat superior,” the Court 
concluded, funding recipients will often be held liable for 
discrimination of which they were “unaware.”303 In light of the 
“central concern” with “ensuring that ‘the receiving entity of federal 
funds [has] notice that it will be liable for a monetary award,’” the 
Court found it “sensible to assume that Congress did not envision a 
recipient’s liability in damages in that situation.”304 Accordingly, in 
cases like Gebser’s “that do not involve official policy of the recipient 
entity,” the Court fashioned a standard of liability that would ensure 
that the entity has notice: “a damages remedy will not lie under Title 
 
 294. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984). 
 295. See id. at 630 & n.9. 
 296. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at 74. 
 299. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287–88 (1998). 
 300. Id. at 277–79. 
 301. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75–76. 
 302. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 282. 
 303. Id. at 287. 
 304. Id. at 287–88 (alteration in original) (quoting Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74). 
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IX unless an official who at a minimum has authority to address the 
alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the 
recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the 
recipient’s programs and fails adequately to respond.”305 
2. Assessment 
 a. Normative Assessment.  In many cases in which it has been 
invoked, the notice principle appears to have done no formal work. In 
particular, the notice-of-remedy variant largely tracks the restrictive 
jurisprudence the Supreme Court has applied to determine the 
existence and scope of private rights of action more generally. In 
Pennhurst, for example, the generally phrased statutory “finding[]” 
that treatment “should be provided in the setting that is least 
restrictive”306 would not suffice to support a private right of action 
even outside of the Spending Clause context under the Court’s 
jurisprudence of implied private rights of action and § 1983.307 Indeed, 
the Court has looked to Pennhurst to determine whether statutes 
adopted under other federal powers are privately enforceable.308 
Similarly, in Gonzaga, the statute’s lack of “rights-creating 
language”309 would likely have doomed any effort to invoke a cause of 
action under § 1983, even if the statute had not been adopted under 
the spending power.310 (It is possible that Spending Clause statutes 
may be especially likely, as an empirical matter, to lack that sort of 
language.) And in Barnes and Arlington Central, the remedies at 
issue—punitive damages and expert fees, respectively—would not 
ordinarily have been available under statutes that were not adopted 
under the spending power.311 
 
 305. Id. at 290. 
 306. Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp., 451 U.S. 1, 13 (1981) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6010). 
 307. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979). 
 308. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) 
(relying on Pennhurst as setting forth part of the standard for determining whether the National 
Labor Relations Act—a Commerce Clause statute—is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
 309. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002). 
 310. Indeed, the bulk of Gonzaga’s analysis proceeds without any discussion of the spending 
power. See id. at 283–87. 
 311. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2464–65 (2006) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that attorneys’ fee–
shifting provisions do not address expert witness fees even absent any special spending-power 
considerations unless Congress makes that clear in the statute); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 
191–93 (2002) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that governmental entities “are 
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In cases like Pennhurst, Gonzaga, Barnes, and Arlington Central, 
then, the notice requirement had little more than rhetorical 
significance to the Court’s holding. To be sure, rhetoric can be 
important, particularly in the signal it sends lower courts. Although 
the presence of conditional spending legislation seems to have made 
no difference to the outcomes of Pennhurst, Gonzaga, Barnes, and 
Arlington Central, lower courts may well take the Court’s language in 
those cases seriously and, in practice, be more parsimonious in finding 
judicial remedies for violations of spending conditions. But it is in the 
other contexts I discussed in the previous Section that the notice 
requirement has had, and is likely in the future to have, the greatest 
bite. 
In my view, there is no good justification for the peculiar 
Spending Clause notice requirement in the cases in which it has bite. 
That requirement seems to draw on both the general clear-statement 
rule that applies when “Congress intends to alter the ‘usual 
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal 
Government’”312—and the policies of constitutional avoidance and 
deliberation that support such a rule313—and the doctrine of contra 
proferentem (the principle that ambiguous terms in contracts are 
construed against their drafters).314 I have no quarrel with either the 
standard federalism-based clear-statement rule or the doctrine of 
contra proferentem.315 But those principles do not justify any 
requirement for notice of (a) the incremental legal effect of a 
spending condition, (b) the outcomes that will follow when the 
 
not subject to punitive damages” even absent any special spending-power considerations unless 
there is “clear congressional intent to the contrary”). 
 312. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State 
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). 
 313. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 631 (1992) (explaining 
that clear-statement rules “can protect important constitutional values against accidental or 
undeliberated infringement by requiring Congress to address those values specifically and 
directly”). 
 314. See 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 32:12, at 471–82 (4th ed. 1990 & Supp. 2008). 
Professor Peter Smith calls these two aspects of the notice rule (federalism and contra 
proferentem, respectively) the “accountability model,” Smith, supra note 34, at 1189, and the 
“state choice model,” id. at 1190; he contends that the latter should predominate, see id. passim. 
 315. In this respect I disagree with Professor Brian Galle, who has written the most 
thorough critique of the Spending Clause notice doctrine to date. See Galle, supra note 34 
passim. Galle writes in terms that would condemn all federalism-based clear-statement rules, id. 
at 199–200, and he entirely ignores the contract-law doctrine of contra proferentem. (Galle 
makes clear that he rejects federalism-based clear-statement rules in Galle, supra note 31, at 52–
53, 72–73.) 
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condition is applied to particular facts, or (c) the underlying facts that 
have occurred and violated the condition. 
When, as in the Second Circuit’s Garcia case, a conditional 
spending statute gives clear notice of the formal legal effect of 
accepting funds, but confusion about background legal principles 
leads the state erroneously to believe that the condition will have no 
practical effect,316 neither of the justifications for the notice rule would 
support excusing the state from performing the condition. In such a 
case, Congress has stated that it intends to alter the “usual 
constitutional balance”317 (in Garcia, by demanding that states waive 
sovereign immunity in exchange for accepting federal funds), so the 
federalism-based clear-statement rule is plainly satisfied.318 For the 
same reason, the rule of contra proferentem would not apply, because 
that rule comes into play only when the terms of a contract are 
ambiguous.319 If anything, the proper contract analogy is the doctrine 
of unilateral mistake. But that doctrine could not help a state in the 
Garcia situation. Under that doctrine, a contract is voidable on the 
grounds of mistake only if it would be in some way unfair to hold the 
mistaken party to its bargain.320 But there is hardly any unfairness in 
holding the state to its bargain in a case like Garcia: the state argued 
that, when it accepted federal funds, it mistakenly thought it was not 
giving the federal government anything in exchange.321 The state 
could not have reasonably expected to get something for nothing.322 
 
 316. See Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 317. Will, 491 U.S. at 65 (quoting Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 242). 
 318. It makes no difference that what the state is waiving is a constitutional right (the right 
to sovereign immunity). Even in the context of individual rights, the Court has held, for 
example, that “[t]he Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand 
every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege.” Colorado v. Spring, 
479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987). 
 319. See 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 314, § 32:12, at 480. 
 320. The Restatement of Contracts, for example, states that a unilateral mistake will make a 
contract voidable only if the mistaken party exercised sufficient diligence and either “the effect 
of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable,” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1979), or “the other party had reason to know 
of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake,” id. § 154 app. (quoting Albert Elia Bldg. Co. v. 
Am. Sterilizer Co., 622 F.2d 655, 656 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 321. Supplemental Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 11–14, Garcia, 280 F.3d 98 (No. 00-
9223), 2001 WL 34108906. 
 322. There is another problem with Garcia. Under standard contract law the proper remedy 
for a unilateral mistake would not be to allow the mistaken party to keep the benefits it 
obtained, while excusing it of its obligations, under the contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 158. But that is precisely what the Garcia court permitted New York to do. 
See Garcia, 280 F.3d at 114–15. 
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The notion that conditional spending legislation should provide 
notice of how it applies to particular facts has more to say for it, but 
not much more. It is a commonplace of statutory interpretation that 
laws may have applications that go far beyond what legislators who 
voted for them might have contemplated. Some of those applications 
might, indeed, raise significant federalism concerns that do not apply 
to the rest of the statute’s applications. The Fourth Circuit thought it 
was confronted with such an application in Virginia Department of 
Education v. Riley—the requirement to provide education to students 
with disabilities even after they have been expelled from school, the 
court believed, entrenched on the state’s core powers of school 
discipline and law enforcement in ways that went well beyond the 
IDEA’s general requirement to educate children with disabilities.323 
When a statute is truly ambiguous, such unforeseen applications 
might well be excised by applying the ordinary federalism-based 
clear-statement rule.324 There is no reason to require any additional 
increment of clarity for statutes enacted pursuant to the spending 
power. And when, as in Riley, the state seeks to read an unexpressed 
exception into a broad statutory requirement,325 the Court’s own 
settled clear-statement doctrine would find no genuine ambiguity: 
“[T]he fact that a statute can be ‘applied in situations not expressly 
anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It 
demonstrates breadth.’”326 
Even though there might be some basis in ordinary clear-
statement principles to excise particular applications that have 
unusually large federalism costs, there is no basis for the rule Justice 
White applied in Guardians and four Justices would have applied in 
Davis and Jackson—that a funding recipient cannot be liable for 
violating a federal spending condition unless that condition is framed 
in such rule-like terms that it is “immediately obvious” what precise 
conduct violates it.327 The federalism-based clear-statement doctrine, 
 
 323. See Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 566–68 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per 
curiam). 
 324. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991). 
 325. See Riley, 106 F.3d at 560. 
 326. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. 
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)). As noted above, see supra note 314 and accompanying 
text, contra proferentem principles also require genuine ambiguity. 
 327. Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 598 (1983) (opinion of White, J., 
announcing the judgment of the Court); see also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 
629, 675 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority’s “multifactored balancing 
test is a far cry from the clarity we demand of Spending Clause legislation”). 
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as it has been elaborated by the Court, is not concerned with the 
forms Congress’s directives to states take. Rather, it is rooted in a 
concern that Congress deliberate before it alters the “usual 
constitutional balance.”328 When a bill in Congress explicitly 
conditions the receipt of federal funds on compliance with a standard 
rather than a rule, it tees up just the sort of deliberation that the 
clear-statement principle demands. Defenders of state prerogatives 
can argue in congressional debates that conditioning federal funds on 
compliance with open-textured standards will work too great an 
imposition on the American scheme of federalism. The more open 
textured are the standards imposed, the more salient those arguments 
are likely to be in Congress. And when Congress clearly imposes 
open-textured standards of liability on states in the face of the 
potential salience of those arguments, it has made a clear “expression 
of intent to ‘alter the usual constitutional balance between the States 
and the Federal Government.’”329 
For similar reasons, contra proferentem principles ought not be 
understood to require that contractual duties be framed as rules 
rather than standards. As Professor Brian Galle points out, modern 
contract theory recognizes that parties may have good reasons for 
agreeing to open-textured duties, and that it is utility-maximizing to 
enforce those duties.330 When a state agrees to accept federal funds, 
and the law makes clear that the funds are conditioned on the state’s 
subjecting itself to an open-textured standard of liability, there is no 
failure of notice. In the context of government contracts, courts have 
articulated an exception to the contra proferentem doctrine in cases in 
which the ambiguity in a contract is “patent” at the time the parties 
entered into it.331 A similar principle ought to apply in the case of the 
federal government’s “contracts” with state funding recipients. 
Nor should the notice principle be read to require that damages 
liability under conditional spending statutes be limited to cases in 
 
 328. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–61 (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 
58, 65 (1989)). 
 329. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 208–09 (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–61). I therefore agree 
with Professor Peter Smith that Congress should have no obligation to legislate with 
extraordinary specificity in the conditional spending context, though (unlike him) I believe that 
both the accountability and state choice models support that conclusion. See Smith, supra note 
34, at 1210–12. 
 330. See Galle, supra note 34, at 170–74. 
 331. See, e.g., Interstate Gen. Gov’t Contractors, Inc. v. Stone, 980 F.2d 1433, 1434–35 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992). 
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which high-level officials of the governmental entity that receives 
federal funds have knowledge of the acts that violate those statutes. 
To the extent that Gebser rested on the notion that the remedies 
under Spending Clause legislation must, as a constitutional matter, be 
so limited,332 the case was wrongly decided. If Congress gives the 
states clear notice that a grant of federal funds is conditioned on the 
state’s assumption of negligence liability—or even strict liability—for 
violations of the grant’s requirements, all of the policies of the notice 
requirement are satisfied. But to the extent that Gebser rested on a 
presumption about what remedial rules Congress would have 
intended—as important language in the Court’s opinion suggests333—
the decision does not unduly constrain congressional power (though it 
ought not be extended to statutes for which a contrary congressional 
intent is apparent).334 
 b. Predictive Assessment.  I have argued that substantial 
normative objections can be raised against some significant possible 
applications of the notice principle. But my point in this Article is not, 
principally, normative. The essential question for my argument is 
whether the Court is likely to agree with my normative concerns. I 
predict that the Court will not, by and large, agree with those 
concerns. It will continue on the path it started in Arlington Central of 
expanding the notice principle. 
The variant of the notice principle that is most likely to be in play 
is the notice-of-application variant. Justice O’Connor provided the 
fifth vote in Davis and Jackson to demand only general notice of how 
Spending Clause statutes applied to particular facts. And the 
gratuitous discussion of the notice requirement in Justice Alito’s 
opinion for the Court in Arlington Central suggests that Justice Alito 
would have joined the dissenters in those cases. There are good 
reasons to think that the newly strengthened conservative majority 
will adopt yet more stringent versions of the notice requirement. 
First, unlike with the direct limitations discussed in Part I, the 
notice requirement allows the Court to avoid the suggestion that it is 
 
 332. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 284–89 (1998). 
 333. See id. at 290 (noting that Title IX’s “express enforcement scheme hinges its most 
severe sanction on notice and unsuccessful efforts to obtain compliance” and stating that “we 
cannot attribute to Congress the intention to have implied an enforcement scheme that allows 
imposition of greater liability without comparable conditions”). 
 334. Gebser may well have been such a case, as Justice Stevens forcefully argued in his 
dissent. See id. at 296–304 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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second-guessing the policy preferences of Congress. Indeed, the 
Court can solemnly state that it is completely willing to follow 
Congress’s clear instructions. Chief Justice Roberts took this very line 
in his confirmation hearings to defend cases like Gonzaga against 
claims that they thwarted congressional will.335 Second, a stricter 
version of the notice requirement will not pose the same problems of 
analytic tractability as do the nexus and coercion requirements. 
Notions of clarity and notice are highly context dependent. A ruling 
that one statute did or did not satisfy the notice requirement is 
therefore unlikely to set much precedent for whether any other 
statute satisfies the requirement. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the notice requirement in 
its post-Guardians form limits only private enforcement (for money 
damages) in court; it does not limit the federal government from 
withholding funds from a noncomplying recipient. This difference is 
significant because most of the spending statutes supported by 
conservatives depend only on withholding of funds, and not on third-
party judicial enforcement, for their success.336 By contrast, the 
spending statutes liberals care about—Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act—all require private enforcement because the threat 
that federal funds will be withheld is remote at best.337 The notice 
requirement thus gives conservative Justices a way to limit 
conditional spending programs supported by liberals without risking 
much collateral damage to those programs supported by 
conservatives. 
 
 335. Professor Simon Lazarus provides a thorough analysis of this aspect of the Justice 
Roberts hearings. Lazarus, supra note 23, at 22–28. 
 336. It is no accident that the four most significant unconstitutional conditions cases 
involving Spending Clause legislation in the past two decades, Rust, Velazquez, Finley, and 
FAIR, have involved situations in which recipients sued to challenge the withholding of funding. 
See supra note 172. 
 337. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF 
TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 294–95 (1995) (noting reluctance of the 
administrations of both political parties to use the fund-termination sanction). To be sure, there 
are occasions in which the federal government decides to withhold funds. (Virginia Department 
of Education v. Riley was one.) But the point is that those occasions are an exceedingly tiny 
proportion of the cases in which funding recipients violate these statutes. 
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CONCLUSION 
I contend that the Roberts Court is likely to limit Congress’s 
conditional spending authority. But it is not likely to do so directly by 
holding that certain funding conditions are unconstitutional. Instead, 
the Court is likely to act indirectly by limiting private parties’ ability 
to enforce funding conditions. The Rehnquist Court took some steps 
in this direction, but it drew back in cases like Davis and Jackson. 
Those cases would likely have come out differently in the Roberts 
Court, and the Court will not want for opportunities to reverse 
them—in substance if not in form.338 If and when the Court does so, its 
decisions will not draw the headlines of cases like Boerne and Garrett. 
But those decisions will have as great an effect—if not a greater 
effect—on the world. 
 
 338. As the Court showed when it upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act in an opinion 
that was flatly inconsistent with—but did not formally overrule—its decision in Stenberg v. 
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), the Court is certainly capable of effectively but not formally 
overruling prior precedent, see Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1635–38 (2007); see also id. 
at 1640–53 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s decision was inconsistent with 
Stenberg and other precedent). 
